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ABSTRACT

This thesis is intended to identify the distinctive traits of Syrian leadership. Its
purpose is to better serve policy makers as they confront the challenges Syria presents.
The first section identifies major research on decision making and leadership analysis.
The second section is an analysis of Syria’s leadership components. The third section
uses several quantitative methods to identify the leadership traits of President Bashar AlAssad. A psychological leadership profile of the figurehead creates added complexity to
the structural analysis, but is relevant because it has the capability of allowing actual
policy makers to deal with their Syrian counterpart. Bashar Al-Assad is found to be a
complex dictator by both Middle Eastern and world standards, who is likely to respond to
challenges slowly, and with an eye towards his domestic constituency. His regime will
continue as long as he can find the right balance between reform and conservation.
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Introduction
Syria is a country with a great deal of current relevance. The country is
considered an ally of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which has aspirations of becoming a
nuclear power. It also has close connections with both Hizbullah and Hamas, considered
terrorist groups whose actions have an effect on the state of Israel, a key U.S. ally in the
Middle East. Further, Syria is one of two countries to take in the majority of refugees
from the Iraq war, many of whom are Sunni, and some of whom are Ba’athists from the
former government of Saddam Hussein. The importance of understanding the country
cannot be stressed enough. However, this paper will focus on a distinct way of analysis,
using a methodology whose primary purpose is not simply academic. Rather, the purpose
of this essay is to use the tools of academics to enable foreign policy practitioners to
interact in a more comprehensive and positive way with those in the government of Syria,
specifically their head of state, Bashar Al-Assad. As a result, this paper will attempt to
“bridge the gap.”

“Bridging the gap” is a metaphor associated with the influential book by the same title, by
Alexander George (1993)...George wrote about the gap between the academic and policy communities,
characterizing it as the divide between knowledge and action. He argues that academic knowledge is
organized along theoretical and generic lines in order to explain international relations, while policymakers
need knowledge about specific actors and problems in foreign policy in order to take action. These
organizational differences create a gap that needs to be bridged between the supply of academic knowledge

iv

and the demand for policy-relevant knowledge.1

This summation of Alexander George by Jerrold M. Post and Stephen G. Walker
identifies a 'gap' between the academy and policymakers. This concept is related to a
trust issue, or confidence 'gap,' which practitioners have in academics. Academics tend to
couch their ideas in dense theory. Conversely, academics lack confidence in practitioners
who follow the outmoded concept of a realism incorporating 'simplistic' notions of power.
The relevancy of this paper lies in its ability to give policy makers an insight into the
actual human being(s) they must interact with, in addition to the structure.
The gap analogy may be applied to theories of international relations. Many
popular theories explain the structures of international relations, but have a weakness in
that they generalize broadly about the individual differences in powerful leaders. For
structuralists, individual agency is only important insofar as it determines how actors
should behave along a single continuum. Post and Walker write: “Depending on the
paradigm at hand, realists see leaders as rational calculators of the relationships between
national goals and national power; liberals conceptualize them as conformists to rules
embodied in international or domestic institutions; and constructivists characterize them
as constrained by cultural norms generated within and between societies.”2 Decisionmaking theorists see agency as a strong factor in the implementation of policy in
international relations. Without agency, diplomats and policy makers fly blind when
dealing with actual individuals within a state.
The importance of decision making in domestic politics is rarely questioned.
1
2

Post, citing George 1993. p. 400
Post. p. 401-402
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Individuals create policy through the intermediaries of powerful leaders or
representatives who posit ideas and create laws. This last thought will be expanded upon
by the discussion of group dynamics, bureaucratic politics, and bargaining theory
discussed later. Decision-making theorists have long been arguing for a change in the
way international relations theory is used. Post and Walker state: “These theorists would
limit universal structural propositions to contingent generalizations based on intervening
causal mechanisms linking structural conditions with foreign policy decision and
international outcomes.”3 A decision-making theory of international affairs would posit
not only a stronger relationship between the domestic and the international as a broad
overarching theory, but also would require a more finely-etched and detailed analysis of
the agency-specific content of individual states.
Currently, no single and unified theory encompasses the research on decisionmaking. However, a number of scholars have created small, finely-chiseled tools by
which they have analyzed the decisions of individuals and small groups. Absent a
consensus on a unifying theory of decision making, using a number of these tools
individually to create a well-crafted picture is the purpose of works like Post's The
Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders, as well as Graham Allison and Philip
Zelikow's The Essence of Decision, a revised version of Graham Allison’s classic study.4
The purpose of this work is to answer the call of Jerrold M. Post. He wants
academics to be able to make valuable contributions to practitioners in the form of
leadership analysis. Government practitioners can then utilize the analyses to respond in
3

Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin 1954; C. Hermann 1969; Allison 1971; Tetlock 1998; Hagan 2002, cited in
Post. p. 402
4
Post. The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders and Allison & Zelikow, Essence of Decision
Revised Edition
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issues of Foreign Affairs. Post began the work with a large undertaking which brings
together a number of different styles of leadership analysis, from the qualitative to the
quantitative, and uses leaders Saddam Hussein and Bill Clinton to elucidate the
individual approaches.5 In order to answer Post’s call, this study will use a number of
different strategies and theories in an analysis of Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad. In an
attempt to demonstrate that the needs of policymakers for strong analytical judgment of
foreign leaders are important, Bashar Al-Assad’s history, psychology, and situation will
be discussed. This leader plays a crucial role in the theater of U.S. interests in such
sensitive areas as terrorism, Lebanese strife, the Iranian sphere of influence, Palestinian
rights, Israeli security and the broader and long-standing issue of peace in the Middle
East.
Syria has a semi-monarchical political system with a hereditary element (at least
one handing over of power to a relative so far). Referendums exist, as well as an attempt
at representation, but the only checks and balances which exist are those of the powerful
elite on that of the government. The bureaucracy is very large and unwieldy, and the
President is new and untried. Further, Syria sits in a volatile region which it contributes
to on occasion. All of these elements provide for a necessary analytical methodology
using both old and new techniques.
In order to ‘bridge the gap,’ I will take a look at decision making theories, broadly
defined, and use them on Syria. The overall structure of this work will begin with a
chapter discussing the strategies and theories which will be used to analyze Al-Assad’s
leadership and decision making. This will primarily be a review of the current literature
5

Post. Psychological Assessment
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along with some helpful organizing principles. This section will begin with an
exploration of the triple-lensed model employed by Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow
to explain the Cuban Missile Crisis.
Allison and Zelikow present three models. Model I is about rational actors.
Model II will be discussed for its institutional significance. Model III will be discussed
with reference to governmental politics. The model ends with a look at groups, but we
will also look at more in-depth group dynamics of decision making regarding the
advisory system's structure as it is laid out by the characteristics of individual leadership.
Bargaining, an aspect of Model III, will also be included. The structure of theory
inherent in Richard Neustadt’s work on U.S. Presidential Leadership is important for
decision making analysis. However, it will be explored primarily for its relevance to
foreign political leadership analysis and decision making. Institutions are important in
Syria, and so a discussion of Max Weber will follow. Finally, we will delve into
psychobiography and other important methods. It will discuss Jerrold M. Post's usage of
quantitative measures to unify a number of different theories from the leading academics
in psychological profiling. Finally, it will conclude with a discussion of the relevancy of
the particular methods discussed.
The second chapter will begin the leadership analysis of Bashar Al-Assad by
focusing on the institutions surrounding Hafiz Al-Assad’s rise to power and continuing on
to Bashar’s tenure, with a look at some of the situations and players surrounding Syria.
This will primarily use structural methods in order to compliment the psychological
component in the third chapter.
viii

The second chapter is important to lay a base of comparison for several reasons:
Hafiz Al-Assad’s regime is far more tested, more has been written about it, and many of
his problems have now been passed on to the son. As a result, the social, political,
religious and military aspects of Syrian society provide a starting point, and a look at the
institutions and some of the more important moves regarding individuals will help shape
this analysis. A situational overview will help to place the profile of Bashar in context
which will come in the final chapter.
The third chapter will seek to explore the man’s psyche. I decided that it was
necessary to compliment the application of existing models with some original research
using cutting edge speech analysis methodologies. This analysis will focus on the
psychological dimension. It will begin with an overview of three useful quantitative
measures. The analysis will not confine itself to just one event, but will apply the
theories and strategies discussed in the quantitative section to dissect interviews and
speeches as a way of projecting possible actions. In doing this research, I brought
together statements from every major period of Bashar’s decade long tenure, and
analyzed the way he thinks using several well-known psychological scales. This
quantitative analysis of Bashar will use the most up-to-date methods of computerized and
objective methodologies. It will include conclusions about the Syrian President and will
discuss Bashar’s world view, creating inferences about how to deal with the man.

ix

Chapter I

Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow set out to explain the Cuban Missile Crisis in
their revised edition to Allison’s seminal work Essence of Decision.6 However, the true
grace of their work lies in the method they chose to use to understand the event in
question. Their argument was three-fold: First, that all types of analysts “think about
problems of foreign and military policy in terms of largely implicit conceptual models,”
using description, explanation, prediction, evaluation and recommendation to understand
a particular event. Second, few models simplify complex events as well as Rational
Actor Model (RAM). Third, and this is the true genius of their work, two additional
models known as Organizational Behavior model and Governmental Politics model are
used to explain the same events.7 In essence, the other two models provide sufficient
complexity to a simplifying archetype. By using each model individually to explain a
large event, the authors hope to add far more depth than could be attained by any one of
the models alone.

Model I
Analysts often refer to major actors making decisions rather simplistically by
saying that 'OPEC has decided to increase the amount of oil it produces daily' or 'Israel

6
7

Allison & Zelikow, Revised Edition
Allison & Zelikow, 3-5
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has decided to invade Lebanon.'8 This type of speech implies a unitary actor, a power
with all-encompassing authority which carries through with a decision. They are
“monoliths [which] perform large actions for large reasons.”9 RAM identifies the
problem, and an optimal “action is chosen in response to the strategic situation the actor
faces.”10 A simplified viewpoint of state as agent is the analytical structure, with a single
set of preferences, perceived choices, and consequences which follow from each
alternative – all to deal with the problem. Several additional concepts to the unitary actor
principle are balance of power, value maximization, and rationality. Each of these
concepts helps to make up RAM.
Allison and Zelikow identify Thomas Schelling and Hans Morgenthau as the
principal writers on balance of power. Morgenthau attempted to explain World War I by
discussing the relative powers arrayed against one another in the form of the Triple
Entente and the Triple Alliance. The authors further show that “one of the major
propositions [of Thomas Schelling's work] concerns the stability of the balance of terror:
in a situation of mutual deterrence, the probability of nuclear war is reduced not by the
balance (numbers of forces of the two sides) but rather by the stability of the balance.”11
Described as an anarchic system like that proposed by Thomas Hobbes, states will
attempt to balance against one another since there is no overarching figure or institution
to control them.12 States are thus always looking for ways to create (or destroy) levels of
power relative to an adversary.
8
9
10
11
12

Allison & Zelikow, 16
Allison & Zelikow, 5
Allison & Zelikow, 24
Allison & Zelikow, 14
Hobbes, Thomas Leviathan. 1651 Edwin Curley (Ed.) 1994. Hackett Publishing
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Value maximization refers to the need of the rational actor to choose the best
possible decision amongst all options. Alternatives exist, as choice is infinite. However,
these alternatives all have consequences, and it is the purpose of the rational actor to
follow through on the choice of “selecting that alternative whose consequences rank
highest in the decision maker's payoff function” or desirability.13 The authors point to an
argument by Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh to describe the decision of Saddam
Hussein to invade Kuwait as a choice amongst economic and geopolitical realities. Due
to the consequences of the Iran-Iraq war, Iraq was in dire financial straits, and Saddam
Hussein also needed a boost to his credibility as leader of the Iraqi people. Thus, they
argue, invading Kuwait would give him an easily winnable war and all the oil money he
would need.14
Rationality, our final concept explaining the definition of the Rational Actor
Model, refers to the need for human beings, as well as states, to follow through with
decisions that are at least believed, if not in actuality, to be a “purposive, goal-directed
activity.”15 This concept simply follows through on the notion in human psychology that
human beings are generally rational and their behavior can thus be predicted with the
right sorts of information. If a forecaster or theorist understands that “rationality refers to
consistent, value-maximizing choice within specified constraints” then the authors
believe that this analyst will be able to make solid judgments about an actor's given
course of action.16

13
14
15
16

Allison & Zelikow, 18
Allison & Zelikow, 14
Allison & Zelikow, 17
Allison & Zelikow, 19
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However, one must carefully consider comprehensive rationality.17 This refers to
the ability of the decision maker to implicitly understand all verifiable alternatives and
rank them in hierarchical order. It has been severely criticized by many scholars for the
impracticality of its use in attempting to understand others. Bounded rationality,
however, allows for limits upon the ability of a human being to compute all, or even the
best, value-maximizing alternatives. It is crucial for leadership analysts because it allows
for the possibility that the leader may be labeled as rational while he or she still follows
through with what may not necessarily be his or her best choice. From this concept, it is
possible to understand why mirror imaging, or the habit of analysts to suggest that a
foreign decision maker should think as they do, is so pervasive. Choosing bounded
rationality requires that “the model accepts the values, beliefs, and stereotypes of the
decisionmaker, irrespective of the accuracy of his views.”18 This is the realm in which an
analyst must concentrate all of his or her energies upon an individual leader and the
decision making structures involved. This is referred to as a “personified state,” as
differentiated hierarchically from the “identified state” which comes next, “generic state”
third, and finally the “notional state” in the simplest, or most general, state.19
However, because RAM leaves room for the possibility of close individual
analysis, this does not mean that it will always be followed. Indeed, one of the problems
with RAM is that analysts have a tendency to 'typecast' with it, by sorting individuals into
groups which can be explained in a generalized way. This system does not easily take
into account “idiosyncratic” values and calculations.20 This weakness has roots in the
17
18
19
20

Allison & Zelikow, 20
Ibid.
Allison & Zelikow, 21
Allison & Zelikow, 51 - 52
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aforementioned mirror-imaging which stems from pure logical inference and a limited
understanding of a particular leader's bounded rationality.

Model II
Model II for Allison and Zelikow is referred to as “organizational behavior.”
Simplistically speaking, since RAM deals with one large, individual actor where
decision-making is formed rationally and clearly, Model II identifies decisions as a
product emanating from an unspecified number of diffuse groups. Continuing with the
'monolith' analogy first discussed at the beginning of the RAM section, the authors write
that Rational Actor Model “must be balanced by the appreciation that (1) monoliths are
black boxes covering various gears and levers in a highly differentiated decisionmaking
structure.”21 Model II is defined less by the choices of individuals than it is by the
choices of an organization within a bureaucracy. An individual within an organization
would act as a free-thinking entity, but together with other individuals and manipulated
by an organizational ethos, they act as a collective with their own specified norms and
values. As a result, a model which leaves individualism out of the equation would
simplify the decision-making process in the key area of understanding the intensely large
federal bureaucracy, and all manner of smaller organizations which act in the same way.
Allison and Zelikow would like their readers to understand five additional points.
First, organizations are brought together to create a unified action where previously
individuals existed under disparate realities and separate circumstance. Second, the
efficiency and capability of producing a specific type of united product can only be
21

Allison & Zelikow, 5
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created under the auspices of organization. Third, organizations constrain behavior along
a specific path. Fourth, the values and norms of the organization must be followed
through the creation of an organizational ethos or culture. Thus, the authors wish to
express how much alike an organization is to a “bundle of technologies” used for a
purpose that wouldn't be possible without those technologies: Flying without an airplane,
driving without a car, etc.
These organizations act in a proscribed way, and are efficient in the manner that
their sole purpose is to create the product they were designed for. The authors write,

The drive toward efficiency, toward the optimal accomplishment of the mission, also
obliges organizations to develop the special capacities of what James Q. Wilson has
called their 'critical task,' a task that forces the organization to formulate distinctive
operational objectives.22

Perhaps the most influential person who has written on aspects of organizations is Max
Weber. Philip and Zelikow write that Weber “viewed organizations as more effective,
sometimes even dangerously effective, instruments of rational choice.”23 Weber had a
keen fascination for the specific qualities of organization, qualities which made it so
effective and consuming in its purpose: “Its specific nature...develops more perfectly the
more the bureaucracy is 'dehumanized,' the more completely it succeeds in eliminating
from official business love, hatred and all purely personal, irrational, and emotional
elements which escape calculation.”24 In other words, the more bureaucracy effectively
22
23
24

Allison & Zelikow, 150
Allison & Zelikow, 147
Weber, 215-216
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eliminates from itself individually-oriented means of interacting with society, and creates
the means for a cohesive, collective decision-making, the more it will become a powerful
way of approaching the implementation of societal laws or norms. For our purposes, this
becomes an effective explanatory tool.
To use this tool, we must see organizations as the most basic unit and foreign
policy as an output of the organization. For Allison and Zelikow, this comes in three
areas: occurrences, effective choice, and organizational structure. The first occurs when
a command is given, as in an organization must carry out the duty. “The decisions of
government leaders trigger organizational routines.”25 Secondly, organizations are the
only way for a government to deal effectively with a problem, and as such they represent
the physical choices possible. This refers to the type of assets which may be called upon.
Third, organizations represent the decisional choices possible for a leader. A leader is not
only constrained by what is possible within an organization, but to a certain extent the
choice has already been made. In a crisis situation, a leader has prepackaged choices like
sanctions, diplomacy or military action. These are choices which have a tendency
towards results considered optimal by an organization.
Allison and Zelikow also use model II to organize concepts, like actors, missions,
objectives and actions from an organizational perspective. This model helps explain the
need for decentralization of control, constraining the decision making potential of
government leaders. It requires that the actions of organizations have already been
established through norms and procedures carried out previously in order that they be
used again. As a result, there is difficulty in creating new behavior without an increase in
25

Allison & Zelikow, 164
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time and energy. The priorities of the organizations are thus determined by past
experience. The prior need for a specific routine will thus shape the action. As a result,
any leader who has no understanding of, or ignores, the inherent restrictions and routines
of organization will likely not like the established outcome mainly due to the difficulty of
changing organizations. Finally, change which does occur will be due to accomplished
actions based (of course) on past routines, whereby the organization will attempt to grow
to take over newly created or required patterns. As a result, most change will occur from
within, rather than from without.

Model III
Concluding their metaphor of the great free standing monolith embodied in RAM,
Allison and Zelikow write that, “large acts result from innumerable and often conflicting
smaller actions by individuals at various levels of organizations in the service of a variety
of only partially compatible conceptions of national goals, organizational goals, and
political objectives.”26 This is an apt characterization of the third and final model for
Allison and Zelikow: Governmental Politics.
Model III's centerpiece is that of bargaining. “The name of the game is politics:
bargaining along regular circuits among players positioned hierarchically within the
government.... Outcomes are formed, and deformed, by the interaction of competing
preferences.”27 The mind frame of this model, as in Model II, is one in which some
degree of decision-making power, influence, or the ability to at least attempt control of a

26
27

Allison & Zelikow, 5
Allison & Zelikow, 255
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foreign policy decisional outcome is relegated to others besides that of an individual
actor with one preference at the top. Power is diffused because of their different
conceptions of prudent policy. Preferences, beliefs and responsibilities to different
constituencies call for the game of political bargaining.
This model has an inherent limitation primarily because of its complexity and
'chaotic’ element, which frustrates the ability of analysts to understand participants,
situations and agendas. Allison and Zelikow comment; “Few experts have the time to
invest in mastering the players and operational details that shape the latest bargains.”28
This is one reason why the rational actor model is so widespread. Cognition in human
beings readily avails itself of pattern recognition. As a result, many analysts find a
pattern that may or may not have everything to do with the leader at the top. However, it
is easily attributed to the leader because of a strong desire to generalize or an insufficient
ability/knowledge to quantify and explain the situation surrounding the immense amount
of actors, institutions, values and norms that exist at the pinnacle of power. To clarify, it
is easier to place the blame on an individual than on a complex interplay of groups and
individuals. This is where model III earns its place in explanation.
The authors primarily refer to Richard E. Neustadt's work on Presidential Power
to define Model III.29 A more in-depth analysis of Neustadt's work will be provided
later, but for Allison and Zelikow, five main principles illustrate their conception of
Neustadt's model. The first is the concept of the separation of institutions sharing
28
29

Allison & Zelikow, 257
An important note here, which shall be touched on later, is that Neustadt was primarily a scholar of US
leadership. As a result, much of his analysis centers on the institutions, laws, ideas and individuals of
the United States. However, it is not difficult to extract a purely theoretical framework which can be
used to generalize about foreign states. Where possible, I will attempt to highlight US-centric points
and those which can be used for analysis of foreign governments.
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powers.30 There is more than just one institution which must be called upon to create a
decision, and their responsibilities do not necessarily align with the authoritative leader.
Though the separation of powers is a very liberal, Montesquieuan conception relegated to
western democracies, the separation of institutions that share power is not. Call it
redundant, bureaucratic, or a prudent division of labor, it is still an important issue for a
leader to confront. The second principle refers to the main ability of the President: the
power to persuade, an informal power. One contention here is that all governments
require some level of persuasion, even the most authoritarian. The third principle
highlights the fact that bargaining isn't random, but occurs along specific lines of
communication. The fourth refers to the fact that it is not the bargaining itself, but the
effect upon the bargaining and its product by the leader which show his capabilities. The
final principle highlights the effect of two-level games. These games bridge the gap
between nations in a way that allows an outside power to have some say over policy
affecting the nation, by discussing that policy and having an effect upon that policy.31
Though the prior examples are largely informal powers, it is unlikely that they
can account for all authority. Formal powers, like the control of the military and
bureaucracy, are just as important. These powers describe the tangible assets which the
leader can bring to bear in order to exercise sovereignty in the case of foreign affairs, and
order in the case of domestic.

Groups

30
31

Allison & Zelikow, 259
Allison & Zelikow, 259 - 262
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Groups are a key component of model III analysis. They bring a multi-causal
function to the study of decision making, which is one step closer in an attempt to
establish a clearer picture of a complex process. Allison and Zelikow highlight seven
causal factors which can be used to explain the output of group processing. The authors
first assume that if one were to bet, using a group would (most of the time) produce a
better decision than an individual.32 A more detailed analysis of why groups produce
good and bad decisions will be discussed later. However, I should note one caveat here:
namely that group decision making is susceptible to its own unique problems. Absent a
healthy respect for those problems, group decision making could very well lead to bad
decisions.
The second causal factor refers to the 'agency' problem, which is unique to
moments when additional figures are brought in for consultation. Though it has been
posited that group decision making is a positive, individuals will bring their own inherent
biases. They will bring “additional, autonomous interests. As the economist Kenneth
Arrow demonstrated in his 'Impossibility Theorem,' with even as few as three
participants, each with different preferences among three options it becomes impossible
to reach a decision that meets the minimum transitivity requirements for rational
choice.”33 That being said, however, the purpose of the additional group members is in
some degree to bring in their individual biases, since those biases have been shaped by
their individual experiences. It is their objectives and interests which are called to
account.

32
33
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The third causal factor revolves around the players. The characteristic make-up
of an individual will help decide how a group is going to make a decision. One can not
understand how a group will make a decision simply based on an analysis of the group as
a whole. The group must be dissected into individuals. The individuals must be
analyzed for their preferences, objectives and experiences.
Understanding the rules of the game is the fourth causal factor. There may be two
separate types of rules, formal rules and informal rules. There may also be two separate
types of institutions with authority over the same issue, and both must be followed in
order to create policy, due to the sharing of powers.34
The fifth factor revolves around the actions taken to move a problem into the
view of policy makers in order for them to create a solution for it. The authors find John
Kingdon's work on policy entrepreneurs to be valuable.35 These policy entrepreneurs
have a variety of tactics at their disposal to attempt to catch the interest of policy making
groups with regards to specific issues. They can either attempt to set the agenda of a
decisionmaking group, or else they can frame an issue in a certain way to make it more
interesting to those with power to affect it. These are people who would not otherwise
find it on their plate of issues to begin with, or at the very least would have it allocated to
a lower level of interest, requiring fewer resources. This is one area in particular where
the divergence of RAM and Model III is emphasized. The authors write,

Social psychologists have observed that people regularly make decisions in ways that
violate the tenets of rational choice. People are, for example, less willing to risk
34
35

Allison & Zelikow, 279
Allison & Zelikow, 280
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losses than they are to take risks for proportionate gains. Thus, decision makers are
still powerfully influenced by the terms in which the problem is framed for them, i.e.,
whether they are choosing to avoid losses or seek gains.36

Being able to figure out the psychology behind risk and what targeted groups are likely to
place on their agenda is a very powerful skill for the analyst. The skill of policy
entrepreneurs is seen (and under emphasized) every day by the example of one
congressman pushing weapons sales to another country, while another intervenes
personally to attempt to save the life of a single family. What goes into the action
channels is extremely complicated, but understanding these crucial parts of government
is essential.
Groupthink is the sixth causal factor, and will be touched on to a greater degree
further along in this section. Groupthink, quite simply, is the idea that individuals within
small groups have a powerful drive to agree with one another. Actions or discussions that
disagree with the consensus are suppressed.37
The final causal factor in explaining groups and their output is the complexity of
joint action, which is attributed to Aaron Wildavsky and Jeffrey Pressman.38 This
concept refers to the difficulty of coordination when additional groups or actors are
added to the decisionmaking process. This could refer to additional domestic groups, as
with regards to a legislative body needing to coordinate action with the executive. It
could also refer to the incredibly complicated environment which occurs when the

36
37
38

Allison & Zelikow, 282
Allison & Zelikow, 283
Allison & Zelikow, 287
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decisionmaking processes of two (or more) separate countries attempt to coordinate
decisionmaking policy.
Allison and Zelikow organize this model by defining who the actors are, how
their preferences come to be, the determining factors in having power over decisions, and
how players come together to make decisions. First to the actors. It is not the rational
actor, nor is it large organizations that bring about policy decision. Rather, it is small
groups made up of diverse individuals acting on their own preferences to promote their
own agenda. “Individuals become players in the national security policy game” write the
authors, “by occupying a position in the major channels for producing action on national
security issues.”39 Thus, who he/she is matters as does the office he/she occupies. Where
a person stands figuratively, or sits literally, as in at an office, influences their priorities,
preferences, interests, and goals. So do influential writers, speeches, and those that can
bend to reach a powerful ear. As does the level of risk or reward behind the problem, or
the speed at which it must be dealt with.40 Their model further identifies three elements
of power which can be a determining factor: “bargaining advantages, skill, and will in
using bargaining advantages, and other players' perceptions of the first two ingredients.”41
The political game is played by way of the previously described action channels, using
specific rule sets that order the game, and by taking action in an environment where no
one individual or interest group functions in a vacuum.42
To use this tool, a model III analyst must understand the rules of the game being
played, the psychological profile, traits or characteristics which result in specific
39
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preference ordering for individuals in specific positions, what they are likely to do and
why, and the figurative setting of the problem.43 The analyst must always assume that
specific results were never intentioned by one individual. No mastermind is 100%
effective in creating the circumstances which gave him or her total control over a policy
decision's enactment and execution. Further, it is important to look at how issues brought
in by subordinates are supplied to the action channels leading to decision makers.44 The
intentions and national interests of other countries must also be taken into account, as the
ability to change policy within the target country is a possibility. How an issue appears to
one group, may be different than how it appears to another group, and details may be
equally sparse about their strategies as well.45 If one group doesn't understand the face of
an issue for another group, then their ability to compete with an alien response would be
limited due to a lack of information or understanding. Many subordinates, because of
their inability to multi-task efficiently, will likely choose inaction on an issue rather than
allow it to affect an issue of greater importance to them. Finally, the authors identify
bureaucratic careerists, lateral-entry types, and political appointees as having differences
in their behavior which “are a function of longer range expectations. The bureaucrat
must adopt a code of conformity if he is to survive...whereas the lateral-entry type and
the political appointee are... interested in policy or some other measure of shorter term
personal achievement.”46

Groups Continued
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An important part of how foreign policy is shaped is often “well-known to
insiders but often overlooked by observers and scholars: many important decisions and
developments in foreign policy are shaped in relatively small groups and informal faceto-face interaction.”47 The authors, Paul 't Hart, Eric K. Stern, and Bengt Sundelius, wish
to show the effects of group politics, how groups are shaped, and most importantly: why
the above mentioned models cannot be counted upon to give a full picture with regards to
groups.48 The authors, as a result, wish to analyze the composition of groups, the
interpersonal dynamics within those groups, and the leadership involved. Understanding
these key variables will give a clearer understanding of a process in foreign policy which
is often left to the pinnacle of power, a concept that is both at the top and very small (in
quantity of individuals rather than the quality of power or authority). Within this process
a number of things happen which have already been partially described by Allison and
Zelikow. This includes conflict between members of small groups, each of whom is
powerful in his or her own right, because of their place at the top of an organization, or
their proximity to the leader, or some other less tangible means of controlling the game of
politics.
To understand how groups work, 't Hart, Stern, and Sundelius describe a typology
of groups to explain their possible purpose and ways of handling situations. Some of
these types describe the ability of the group to deal with its own processes. This is more
of an internal level of analysis. Others show more of an external level of analysis by
describing how issues outside of the group are dealt with.49 The first type is that of the
47
48
49

Ch. 1 of Beyond Groupthink. Paul 't Hart, Eric K, Stern, and Bengt Sundelius. 4-5
't Hart, Stern and Sundelius. 5
't Hart, Stern and Sundelius. 25

16

think tank, which is really about information processing and the ability of a group to
analyze the situation. The second is the command center, which illuminates what was
previously said about the group being at the top of the food chain. The authors define the
role of this form of group as a response to international crisis by issuance of order and
use of power. The third type is that of sanctuary. This group system revolves around the
leader's need for emotional or rhetorical support, a set of mini-leaders who take some of
the burden off the main leader. The fourth type is the arena. “Political divisions... and
bureaucratic politics provide two powerful centrifugal forces that beset collegial decision
making.” The fifth type is that of sorter. This type is characterized by the action
channels which carry issues from obscurity to perspicuity. The sixth type is that of
ideologue, whose purpose “is to articulate and embody the core values and norms
advocated by the chief executive, the organization as a whole, or the prevailing policy
paradigm.” The seventh type is slightly complex, and is that of the smokescreen. It
refers to the need of formal institutions to act as a legitimating mechanism for
government while the informal institution (or group) enacts the real policy.50
Two additional perspectives will be helpful in understanding the authors’ intent to
describe group analysis. This format is structured, to some degree, much like Allison and
Zelikow's levels of analysis, but with groups. An attempt is made to define and identify
all the causal factors which act upon groups and, in turn, where groups act upon others.
First is the agency-structure perspective which identifies two sides to the whole. To
begin with, small groups have their own individual structures which must be understood
from an “individual component” level of analysis. Next, small groups must be seen as a
50
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whole unit, which is acted upon by outside forces and the “structural parameters” it is a
part of and which may in turn be acted upon by the group.51 As a result, 't Hart, Stern and
Sundelius argue that these small groups are heavily constrained, acted upon and defined
by their institutional environment. This institutionalization of the small (highly-placed)
group occurs at three levels.52 At the macro-level, the small group is affected by the
national-level political context which utilizes the sorts of elements making up a society's
institutional mores. At the meso-level, the group must act within (and upon) the context
of its immediate institutional surroundings. At the micro level, the elements of the group
structure act upon the group itself, defining it in a unique way based on the sum of its
parts.
Much like how analyzing the institutional impact upon small groups occurs, it is
also important to identify the way in which the leader affects the small group. This
impact is felt in an important way with regards to the advisory system process. Thomas
Preston devised an elaborate format to identify how interactions between various levels
of the government occur. First, citing Stern and Sundelius, the impact is felt at both the
foundational and interactional levels. For the foundational level, Preston writes “leader
characteristics impact upon the nature of the organization matrix (i.e., through the
reaction of initial group structures, selection of members, establishment of formal and
informal influence channels for advice.” With regards to the interactional level, Preston
writes that “leader characteristics impact upon the internal dynamics of groups (i.e.,
through the establishment of group decision rules, the types of advice encouraged,
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tolerance of group conflict, establishment of general norms regarding leader-advisor
relationships).”53 Preston further argues that this impact takes place within the “policy
context,” involving relations with all other pertinent actors, and the “problem context,”
which refers to the particular problem of the day as defined by whatever is at the
forefront of the action channel. How, or even whether, a President sees the policy and/or
problem contexts “is often dependent upon (1) the cognitive sensitivity, or attentiveness,
of leaders to the external environment, (2) the effectiveness of their advisory systems in
gathering information from the operational policy environment to inform policy
deliberations.”54 Perception, for Preston and a number of the individuals he analyzes, is
the key variable here, not actual reality. Due to the way information is presented, which
can come at an opportune moment, in a specific order, by a particularly (un)trusted
source, or even in a type of speech or manner that is pleasing or unpleasing to the leader,
the perception of the context can make for both good and bad decisions. This is also
sometimes referred to as 'framing.'
A key purpose for Preston of the impact described above, also known as the
'Leader-Group Nexus,' is to identify the individual characteristics which decide important
decision-making realities within the group, such as the way information moves through
advisory channels (information management) before getting to the leader, or the ability of
the leader to have his or her preferences carried out (authority structure).55 These styles,
along with the type of information a leader requires during decision-making (information
processing), the quality of interaction amongst a President and his or her staff
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(interpersonal orientation), and the need or shunning of conflict within the advisory
group during decision-making (conflictual orientation), are important tools for analysts to
discover the type of effect upon the structure of the advisory group system.56 All of these
indicators of style point to different elements of control. By analyzing “individual
characteristics of leaders, such as the need for power, prior managerial background, self
confidence, and locus of control” the type of style(s) a leader uses can be identified. By
combining the requisite styles with appropriate historical or theoretical comparisons, an
approximation can be acquired of how a leader will respond to a crisis.57 This format is
particularly useful because of its strong ties to trait analysis. As a result, trait analysis
may be used to gauge not just a leader's cognitive dimensions, but also their advisory
system and process.
One particular element which must be highlighted in a discussion of group
dynamics is the how, why, and degree to which political manipulation occurs. The
process of decision-making focuses on the actions of a number of individuals who have
their own agenda. Paul D. Hoyt and Jean A. Garrison write,

Within a group populated by policy advisers, often acting as policy advocates,
questions of access to the decision-making group, status and influence within the
group (especially vis-a-vis the president), and influence over the decision-making
process are central to moving the group towards a favored position. Policy actors,
aware of the necessity of access and influence, make efforts to manipulate the
composition of the group during the group construction stage and to manipulate the
56
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interpersonal relations and processes of the group during the deliberative stage.58

The question of why the actor manipulates, or why there is manipulation within agency in
general, has an answer with roots in the rational actor model above; namely preference
seeking. Each actor is somewhat akin to the leader in that agency is considered to matter.
They are not simply seeking to follow the views or preferences of their leader, they have
their own. Though a leader may decree objectives for the administration, or an overall
strategy for policy focus, the fact remains that the advisors are made up of individuals
who themselves head other agencies (in many cases), or at the very least have their own
particular backgrounds, views, and cognitive development.
These advisers can accomplish their own objectives through a number of different
strategies. The first strategy for manipulation entails the guest list. Actors can
strategically maneuver to halt members from gaining access to the group, both at the
initial stages and while the issue is still salient. This is called exclusion.59 The opposite
point, widening the group, called inclusion, serves to pull more potential advisers into the
policy making process to enhance the power of a particular faction.60
During the time at which the issue is being discussed, a savvy political adviser
can attempt to “control the process or procedures and efforts to gain compliance through
the manipulations of interpersonal relationships.”61 It is during this phase that agents
seek to use bargaining tactics, coercion, persuasion, manipulation of process and other
devices to pursue their preference. In the second strategy, procedural manipulation,
58
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attempts to set the agenda, and occurrences of framing may be used.62 If an individual
can manipulate the setting in which a particular piece of advice is aired, then that piece of
advice might have more or less impact based solely on who backs it, how many back it,
and the circumstances in which it was brought out. Similarly, framing refers to the ability
to present the issue in a positive or negative context, outside of the style or light that a
leader would normally expect in making the best possible decision.
The third strategy identifies manipulation and is differentiated from the second in
that it has to do more with the relationships between individuals. One individual,
cognitively complex and with his or her own idea for policy, must seek to influence
another individual, or set of individuals. This is done by taking advantage of one's
position of power to coerce or pressure.63 Under this strategy, coalition building can also
be a strong method of control.64 The struggles between major players on the same foreign
policy team could have far reaching consequences. It could be played out in front of the
media. Collateral damage could fall on others, both individuals and organizations.

Bargaining: Understanding Political Change
An important aspect of Model III discussed earlier is bargaining theory.
Bargaining theory has an important component called Political time, developed by
Stephen Skowronek. The best way to describe this concept is to use the example of U.S.
Presidential leadership. An incoming president must deal with the policies of his
predecessor, the events occurring which cause certain legislative and political initiatives
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to be addressed, and how to wield authority for constructive change. Skowronek “sees
political time as a function of increasing and decreasing opportunities to lead.”65 The
political bargaining model is thus aptly suited to analyze the situational context as it
relates to the personal.
No scholar has done more to create a model which analyzes political change in a
leadership context than Richard E. Neustadt. He has developed a template for measuring
the power of individual presidencies, as they run up against the federal government. This
model's strongest aspect is its ability to identify change from one administration to the
next, and to use this change to analyze the context of the targeted leader accordingly.
Under this rubric, he identifies six points: questions of legitimacy, changes in institutional
detail, changes in policy environment, human qualities of presidential leadership, power
calculations leading to bad policy, institutionalized and the institutionalized presidency.66
Neustadt's model sets the context by which an in-depth at-a-distance analysis
using psychological mapping of a leader and his or her decision-making apparatus may
be developed. Though Neustadt's own analysis of the psychological dimensions of
leadership are not particularly extensive, he is amongst the best of Presidential scholars,
and his model is stratified to a degree which allows the formula to be used in an efficient
manner to describe leadership and decision-making. Further, any aspect is capable of
upgrade without affecting the whole in a negative way. The analysis of Bashar uses
many of the concepts, headings and sub-headings, albeit in no particular order, in an
attempt to create an understanding of the stresses of bargaining in Syria.
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Neustadt’s Bargaining Model
I. Legitimacy Questions and Sentiments of Loyalty
A. Popular Legitimacy (general prestige)
i. Handling of perceptions of the major issues
a) Combating and Using Media
b) Public perception of leadership decisions*
B. Government Legitimacy (professional reputation)
i. Pressure on Colleagues (others with power)**
a) Legislative body
b) Judicial body
ii. Use of executive underlings
a) Military
b) Cabinet
c) Organizations under Leader
C. Formal Legitimacy
i. Official Vested Powers
a) Real and perceived
b) Established routine powers by predecessor
II. Changing Institutional Detail
i. The necessities of bargaining
ii. Representative changes***
a) The lessening of restrictions on a leader
•
Examples:
•
Appointments, Press relationships, Cabinet Contacts,
Congressional relations, Bipartisan consultations
b) The procedural constraints on a leader
•
Examples:
•
War-making, Impoundments, Renominations
III.
Changes in Policy Environment
A. Dealing with Sub-issues and Actors
IV.Human Qualities of Presidential leadership
A. Temperamental fitness
i. intellectual and emotional intelligence
ii. Past history
V. Power calculations leading to bad policy
A. Difficulties of power as a source of clues to policy
VI. The Institutionalized Presidency
A.
Agencies, institutions, etc.
* The extent of the ability of the media to operate freely must be taken into account, as well as
the degree to which the public perception matters as compared to a democracy where the public
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must be listened to. Constituencies, however, will exist in most cases.
** Very few regimes operate under a strictly authoritarian style, and as such there will invariably
be other powerful members within a government where 'bargaining' amidst reputational dynamics
will be important.
*** Neustadt notes 8 representative changes within the architecture of US leadership.
Representative changes in a comparative political context will need to be discovered by the
individual analyst.
**** The degree to which information is available about the inner workings of a more closed
society is a difficult barrier for the analyst.67

Weber and Authority
Max Weber was instrumental in the initial work done on institutions characterized
in Model II analysis. Though the analysis of Bashar Al-Assad will not be divided based
on the Three Model paradigm, the institutions of Syria warrant a separate section unto
themselves, and as a result, a deeper look into Weber is also warranted.
Weber's work on bureaucracy came during a time when he was witness to the
breakdown of what he called 'traditional' authority, which is an authority adhered to
because of its honored place in time and society. As traditional authority collapses,
organizations and the state would employ mediating institutions of social behavior which
would step into a fundamentally needed role as Weber's second form of authority;
'rational-legal' authority.68 This type of authority forms the basis for a legitimate form of
government, especially in the modern era. The third and final type of authority,
charismatic authority, is short-lived, may interrupt either bureaucratic or traditional
67
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authority, and is based in the abilities of an accomplished leader.69
Rational-legal authority may also be characterized as bureaucratic authority, since
it is institutions rather than traditions or individuals which allow for the efficiency in
large government. Rational-legal authority can lead to “the subsumption of diverse
social action on a regular basis under stable prescriptions, regulations, and rules” and
“accounts for its comparative technical superiority vis-a-vis traditional and charismatic
rulership.”70 Rational-legal authority is based on laws, not people, and thus may be seen
as non-arbitrary, as a form of unchanging legitimacy which has its origins in reason
(rational) and logic (law). It is for this reason that Weber elevated the role of bureaucracy
to the status of having control over society, and it is for this reason that Model II holds
such keen potential for analysis. The bureaucracy may be used in the singular sense, but
it is not always effective to characterize it as a unitary actor. Care should be given to
identify the institutions and organizations within the bureaucratic framework.
Institutions are endowed with authority through their codification into existing
law, but they are obeyed for another reason. Anthony Giddens, in his book Capitalism
and Modern Social Theory, writes that the obeyer does not necessarily obey because of
“personal dependence on him, but because of their acceptance of the impersonal norms
which define that authority.”71 These norms have been:

…consciously established within a context of either purposive or value rationality...
'thus, the typical person holding legal authority, the “superior”, is himself subject to
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an impersonal order, and orients his actions to it in his own dispositions and
commands'. Those subject to legal authority owe no personal allegiance to a
superordinate, and follow his commands only within the restricted sphere in which
his jurisdiction is clearly specified.72

The framework of authority’s existence is really a function of legitimacy, and
legitimacy has the ability to change and shift.
Weber's understanding of society and history was really a belief in the changing
form of analysis. He understood the world through norms, seeing traditional norms as
being usurped by legal norms. Weber saw the power of individuals, but only for a
limited time and under specific circumstances. The tendency of his analysis was
towards an institutional context, a critique that has heavily influenced the shape of
modern bureaucratic and authoritative analysis.
In order to understand decision making in Syria, it is necessary to consider the
context in which decisions take place. As a result, the concepts of legitimacy and
authority which Weber helped to elucidate are very important.

Psychological Assessment
The importance of psychological assessment should not be understated, and a
number of individuals have created models with which to create tangible results. Jerrold
M. Post, Stephen G. Walker, and David G. Winter identify three types of personality
assessments developed by the major pioneers in the field of leadership personality
72
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profiling. These three are “cognitive, personality traits, and comprehensive qualitative
case studies integrating psychobiographic analysis with a psychodynamic analysis of
character.”73 All three types have valid methodological input for a number of different
models. The purpose of these models is to find the “causal mechanisms” which affect the
decision-making process of individuals. The structural environment is not overlooked,
but does provide context and a certain impact on the aforementioned causal
mechanisms.74 Though elements of overlap exist amongst the described methods, an
understanding of each is essential for a strong model of psychological profiling. The
quantitative aspects of trait analysis, operational coding and integrative complexity will
be discussed later. As an introduction to qualitative analysis, this section will begin with
a look at some past methodological designs; continue with a discussion of the cognitive
dynamics of risk taking; and finish with recent qualitative theory.

1. Past Methodological Designs
Richard C. Snyder, H.W. Bruck and Burton Sapin's methodology begins with a frame
of reference, rather than a generalizable theory. Snyder was interested in shifting the
decision-making analytical construct from the 'state' to human decision making. Broadly
speaking, he had the decision-makers of state 'X,' represented as being within an 'internal
setting,' as being able to take an action which not only affects the decision makers and
the internal setting of the state, but also the decision makers of an alternative state.75
More precisely, Snyder looked at a scientific way of exploring the decision making
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process by analyzing a diverse set of elements. These included the internal setting made
up of sub-elements like society and culture, to Social Structure and Behavior, made up of
values, institutions and groups, to the External Setting made up of other cultures and
societies.
The decision makers cause an action, which affects themselves as well as the
External Setting and the Social Structure, which affects the Social Structure and in turn
affects and is affected by the Internal Setting.76 Snyder was widely regarded as the
original thinker in pulling together various elements of the social sciences as well as the
scientific method. However, as Charles F. Hermann and Gregory Peacock would later
write about the methodology, "to apply it empirically required detailed data on numerous
variables that the social sciences in the late 1950s had only begun to develop. It is little
wonder that the major direct application of the Snyder framework used the case study
technique (i.e., Paige, 1968)."77
Michael Brecher did enormous amounts of field work to understand his subjects.
His methodology should be added as one of the better ones in pioneering decision
making theory. His methodology is case study combined with a complex research
design. "Contrary to conventional wisdom or myth, a decision is made by identifiable
persons authorized by a state's political system to act within a prescribed sphere of
external behaviour."78
There are two elements to the framework used by Brecher: Systemic and
Dynamic. The systemic element attempts to identify the foreign policy system, which is
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made up of inputs, processes and outputs. The inputs have operational (factors which
affect a state's behavior beyond its own borders) and psychological (a view of decisionmaking elites as identified by ideology, tradition and history) components.79 Brecher
further identifies four different issue areas, namely Military, political, economic and
cultural. He then identifies the processes, whereby decisions are 'formulated' and then
'implemented.' Then there is feedback, which determines the consequences of the
foreign policy decision. The concept of feedback is then transferred into the idea of the
dynamic interaction: Brecher's thought is that systems are highly complex, and have
continuous movement of inputs, processes and outputs. This involves "the amassing of
empirical data on a foreign policy issue and their integration into a structured analytic
framework."80
The process goes something like this: First, one must seek out the correct
components for the right issue. Next, figure out who the decision-makers are. Third,
utilize the input, process and output phase methodology in order to analyze decisional
processes. Once these are analyzed, then a decision can occur. Decision process data is
put together to construct the 'decision flow through time,' which involves a linear graphic
to display the pre-decision processes as well as the implementation. Finally, feedback is
analyzed - an attempt to understand the consequences of the decision. Brecher would
then utilize very carefully constructed case study to make his point. He was tireless and
exhaustive in his research and methodology, and ended up contributing phenomenal
integrations of theory and reality.
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In determining how actors create foreign policy, Margaret Hermann, Charles
Hermann, and Joe Hagan identified an early typology for the determination of the
'ultimate' decision making unit in a given country.81 The authors maintain that decisionmaking units fall into one of three types: a predominant leader, a single group or multiple
autonomous groups. That there are typologies within this last methodology is obvious,
and the first Hermann, Margaret, will come up again later when she continues her work
into more identifiable trait analysis and typological categorizing.
Whether or not the category being looked at is the ultimate decision-maker
depends upon one of two conditions, based on a control variable. For a predominant
leader, the contextual sensitivity is all important. If the leader is insensitive, then he
follows his own background and views, and if sensitive, then there is some amount of
'penetration' of the decision making process by other elements in the regime.82 For a
single group, the variable is concurrence, if there is agreement, then the single group's
views are primary, and if there is disagreement, then elements outside the group begin to
have a say in decision making.83 For multiple autonomous groups, the relationship
amongst groups is the control. If there is a zero-sum relationship, then ‘deadlock’
occurs, and when there is no zero-sum relationship, then each group recognizes at least
some legitimacy within the other, and is more likely to reach agreement.84

2. Risk Taking
The propensity for risk in international relations is a key variable required for a
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thorough analysis of leaders and decision making. The need, or lack thereof, for risky
behavior, is a function of the process which breeds these decisions. Risky behavior can
occur with regards to conflict, but can span the gamut of action. It really refers to the
points discussed above about political and international bargaining. There is both an
individual and a small group context to this process which should be taken into account.
Another divide is that of the situational and the character of the people involved. All four
elements should be interwoven in order to penetrate the dynamics of risk taking.
Margaret G. Hermann and Paul A. Kowert sought first to understand the general
theories regarding risk taking, and then to explore the high level of variance which the
theories did little to describe.85 Theories have been used to explain risk broadly from a
systemic viewpoint, and Herman and Kowert describe a number of such theories. In
doing so, they illuminate a need for individual leadership analysis of cognitive traits and
dispositions. One theory the two question assumes that all leaders engage in risk to
roughly the same degree. Still another theory allows for difference, but equates that
difference with the need to develop alliances where more alliances mean less interest in
risk. Deterrence theory and rational choice theory explain risk and allow for individual
difference but do not attempt to examine the difference individually.86 According to the
authors, prospect theory has had a wide following and seeks to explain risky behavior
from a situational point of view. Hermann and Kowert write, “Its central insight- that
people's willingness to take risks depends on how problems are framed and on the
reference point that decision makers use to assess utility – assumes that the situation, and
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not the character of the people involved, shapes behavior.” This theory has merit because
of its experimental success rate of roughly two out of three successful results.87 Two out
of three may be high, but the fact that a third of cases can't be explained by prospect
theory points to a glaring gap. The goal for Hermann and Kowert is to find the
motivations and characteristics which explain the failure percentage in prospect theory.
Prospect theory relies upon the proposition that leaders are willing to take risks in
order to avoid losses, but are unwilling to take risks for commensurate gains. Using the
NEO PI-R to measure the groups of traits found in the Five-Factor model, and using the
Myers-Briggs Type Indicator scale, Hermann and Kowert are able to “identify strong
personality predictors of generalized risk taking.”88 The results of the work found
characteristics associated positively with risk taking like openness in thinking and
openness in deed; these are correlated with mischievousness, humor, adventurousness
and versatility. Another positive correlation is the penchant to simply ignore risks.
Though excitement seeking is correlated with risk, extroversion, which was thought to
be, isn't necessarily.89
Hermann and Kowert are also interested in the collusion of the framing effect
with personality. As a result, they come up with conclusions regarding these two factors
which serve to create a model. This is a three stage model, which employs awareness,
framing and decision stages, and takes account of personal style. In the awareness stage,
those with anxiety and sensitivity characteristics will be characterized by their personal
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style as agreeable altruists or sensation seekers. The altruist, as loss becomes greater in
the framing stage, will conclude with risk aversion in the decision stage. This leader is
among those who are “more agreeable, altruistic, feeling individuals [who] prefer to
avoid risks, but especially when facing a loss (and presumably when even greater harm
would come to someone because of the risk.”90 Those with a high openness and
intuitiveness are called sensation seekers. When they frame an increase in the prospect
for gain, even with less surety of that gain, they will decide on risk acceptance. Further,
some who are anxious and sensitive will follow the tenets as outlined in prospect theory;
for a gain there is risk aversion, for a loss there is risk acceptance. The final group is
correlated with low anxiety and is insensitive, staying constant with regard to risk and
framing issues, and is thus risk insensitive.91
Another theory where the situational category is married eloquently to the
personality of individuals was the brainchild of Michael Colaresi in his When Doves Cry:
International Rivalry, Unreciprocated Cooperation, and Leadership Turnover.92 The
situation is a rivalry context. The two personality types are those who collude with a
rival (dove) and those who take a harder stance towards a rival (hawk). Colaresi's
conclusion is that in this particular situation, a dove is more likely to be removed from
power than a hawk. In Colaresi's multilevel model of rivalry maintenance and leadership
tenure, the outcome, if not the purpose, is to sustain the rivalry.93 Whether or not the
hawk or the dove acts, competition is maintained. This occurs for several reasons. First,
it is possible that “external conflict and threats affect the domestic political alignments
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within a state.”94 This refers to the ability of a leader to keep power through the
bargaining process with targeted powerful players or organizations at the domestic level.
The second reason a rivalry will maintain itself is when a dove chooses to become a hawk
in order to stay in power.95 This is a theory where the situational context comes into play
as a match-up between the international and the domestic, with a leader's particular
characteristic as a defining factor. Further, this may explain the prevalence of secret
negotiations, due to the fact that a leader in a rivalry maintenance situation will likely not
be willing to be seen as engaging in over-cooperation.96
The attributes of group risk behavior are somewhat different than those for a
single individual. Yaacov Y. I. Vertzberger argues that there are four causal explanations
for groups participating in risky behavior.97 The first is familiarization, which argues that
diverse individuals brought together, exposed to increasing amounts of new information,
will be more and more likely to consider bold behavior. The second, cultural values,
refers to the theory that the two core cultural values are risk-acceptance and caution. The
predominant value comes to the forefront, and a multitude of factors serve to strengthen
that value with regard to the situation. Persuasion is the third explanation, and refers to
social factors within the group. This tends to lean towards riskier behavior, as those
champions of risk tend to commitment towards their policy with greater confidence. The
final explanation is responsibility diffusion. This point emphasizes the possibility that
group members will believe themselves insulated by numbers in their promotion of risky
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tendencies.98 Groups will take risks depending on perception and acceptability of risk.
Vertzberger writes, “First, risk will be taken when it is perceived to be below a
predetermined nonacceptability threshold. Second, risk-taking preferences will change in
response to increases and decreases in the acceptability levels.”99 Certain explanations
will have processes which will be more likely to have changes in either risk perception or
risk acceptability, depending on the group and the situation. For example, the
explanation of persuasion will be more likely to have a “group-induced change in risk
acceptability,” but not its perception.100 This only means that the underlying perception
of the risky behavior does not change, only the will to go through with it. Lastly, there
are four overall group attributes, as differentiated from the group dynamics discussed
above, which affect risk-taking: Group composition, decision-making procedures and
norms, the distribution of power, and members beliefs and aspirations. All of these have
been discussed in other areas, but it is important to remember that they also have a role in
the probability that a group will tend towards risk.

3. Qualitative Designs
The qualitative case studies approach attempts to draw together two elements for
analysis. This approach has been described as follows: “In the psychobiographic
analysis, they delineate important events in shaping the leader's psychology and then
assess the dimensions of political personality, attempting to identify the basic
personality/character structure.”101 They attempt to understand the psyche by taking a
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look at the causal factors in one's youth, adolescence, or general development past these
two periods which affect the subject with regards to political acumen. They also wish to
understand one very important factor, which is context. Therefore analysts “attempt to
discern which public actions are driven by private motives and to detect recurrent
patterns of political behavior.”102
As mentioned above, the context and structure of the situation shapes the outcome
to a certain extent, but it is the leader's personality which shapes how they respond with
regards to management, negotiation, strategic decision making, crisis decision making,
rhetoric, cognitive style and leadership in general.103 Post uses what he calls 'anamnesis,'
to form his model. The purpose of anamnesis is to construct a psychobiography of key
life transitions, goals, mentors, heroes, issues and experiences, and also to construct a
map of “the subject's cognition, affect, and interpersonal relationships.”104 Further, Post
provides the critical context by arguing that other factors like politics, culture, and history
all play a crucial role in developing the psyche. This being said, one important aspect to
take into consideration is the degree to which restraint is imposed upon the subject.105 An
understanding of the subject's cognitive functions is worthless if an equal understanding
of the setting which the subject must play in is not understood. More will be discussed
on this subject in the bargaining section, or Model III.
Post draws a connection between the narcissistic, obsessive-compulsive, and
paranoid personality types, their belief systems, and leadership styles. Each of the
personality types will display certain ego defenses (the paranoid uses denial, distortion
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and others, the compulsive becomes unable to make decisions, and the neurotic uses
dissociation, displacement, isolation, etc.). These ego defenses affect the individual's
belief systems, and as a result can help the analyst, academic or political leader
understand how an individual is likely to make decisions.106 These types have a host of
generalizable factors which may be used to understand the basic projection of a leader
afflicted with one of these defenses. Post's final model follows five parts: the
psychobiographic discussion, the personality description, the subject's world view, their
leadership style, and their generalizable outlook.107 Under each of these is an entire
rubric consisting of helpful questions and subsets for the analyst to consider, from the
health and intelligence of the subject in the personality section, to their identification with
their country in the world view section. This model is comprehensive in the sense that it
attempts to answer all the pertinent questions required for a complete cognitive map.
Stanley A. Renshon also writes on psychobiography and cognition. He gives a
number of helpful strategies as well as mechanisms to avoid during the course of one's
analysis, arguing that the analyst of the subject must operate at three levels: historical
fact, interpretation and meaning, and theory.108 He takes into account what is commonly
known, or understood to be true, how the leader’s past has influenced them in the light of
the analyst interpreting the subject's understanding of his or her own past, and the sorts of
generalizable ideas or theories we use to explain our interpretations of the subject's
thought process and behavior. On cognition, Renshon draws up a framework to analyze
based on three specific aspects of character: ambition, character integrity and
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relatedness.109 According to Renshon, these are not simply individual traits like
achievement, power and affiliation. However, they do share some relation since there is
also some overlap regarding motivation. Ambition is the goal of life, and the ability to
achieve that goal. Integrity refers to the “moral, ethical and motivational principles that
provide a true-to-self compass through choices.”110 Relatedness refers to the emotion of
the subject as defined by the interpersonal relationships he or she keeps. These three
aspects of character help Renshon to codify the psychobiographic content's impact on
personality.111

Conclusion; the Integration of Theory and Reality
The theory discussed in the previous chapter is a good start to understanding
decision making. However, theory must be tested in order to become anything more than
a hypothesis. In order to move from the tools of chapter 1 to the reality of chapter 2, a
decision must be made as to which tools are feasible, and which fall short in this
particular instance. These decisions are not made lightly. Some are only made after
countless hours of research has already been undertaken. Nonetheless, certain tools are
not right for every task. Decision making theory has gone through many changes, and in
some respects has similar characteristics to early realist analytical methods used by Greek
writers like Thucydides. Much of it would begin to shift with the introduction of Snyder,
and then later Brecher. Others contributed to this shift, but the groundwork needed to be
laid for foreign policy decision-making analysis. These early works are important to the
109
110
111

Renshon, 110
Renshon, 110
Post, Walker, 64

39

following analysis only in so much as later decision making theorists built off the early
methodologies already described. They stood on giants, so to speak.
Rational Actor Model is important for Bashar primarily because it has been used
successfully to describe his father. Hafiz Al-Assad was a paragon of this model, a
rational actor who could be understood if one decoded the complex field he gamed on.112
Model II analysis, which has to do with organizations within a bureaucracy, is also very
important. The Ba’ath, military and Allawi are all more or less organized constituencies
who dealt within a large country-wide framework, itself ironically a product of the
‘trifecta’ which made the state so dependent upon itself. As will be explained in greater
detail later, these three started off as individual organizing forces, later created the power
structure of the state, and then became themselves the institutions they themselves helped
to prop up. Model III is important because it takes into account ‘bargaining.’ Questions
must be asked, like what makes a leader legitimate, and how does he handle the loyalty of
his subordinates and people? What kind of pressure does he bring to bear, and how does
he use the organizations under his command. What are his perceived powers vs. his real
powers? What kind of mind does he have, and how does he use it to deal with problems,
issues and actors?
Model III is both the most powerful, and the most reliant upon a crumbling fourth
leg. Namely, it says that it can understand the complexity of what a leader will do, so
long as it can understand the issues and processes which surround him. Syria is a
shadowy state with information issues, but in attempting to understand the invisible
undercurrent of Syrian society, Model III can be useful. There are specific examples
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when taking into account the five major principles of Model III; institutions which share
power, power to persuade, communication channels, the leaders capabilities, and the
effect on the inside by outside powers. All of these principles have examples, and the
analysis will be interwoven within the next chapter. Lastly, Neustadt’s methodology has
been loosely ascribed too, but not followed in any coherent form. Issues like legitimacy,
pressure on colleagues and underlings, bargaining amongst institutions, the media,
different institutions, formal and informal powers, and the representative changes in
government are all discussed at one point or another.
Groups are also an important aspect of the US government, and a key conceptual
concept in Model III analysis. Few people have any idea what goes on behind the closed
doors of the highest office in the United States, but it is widely understood that the
President’s inner group has a powerful voice. If it is difficult to get information about
high-levels groups in the United States, it is next to impossible to get the information
about Bashar’s advisors. However, Syria’s very authoritarian bent also makes it less of a
problem. A dictator is more likely to keep his own council than a democratic one. Still,
who Bashar chooses to keep around him is important, but any group analysis of Syria’s
presidency would be woefully inadequate.
A psychological profile of leadership is also very important. A fully articulated
psychobiography should have a very in-depth history to work from. It should also take
into account what Bashar has to work from in terms of his mental faculties. Of course
there is some overlap with other theories, like Neustadt’s bargaining, which look to a
President’s temperamental fitness to gauge his actions. Using the history of Syria, the
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father as a guiding light, and Bashar’s own temperament will help to gauge his actions,
but so will the objective use of trait analysis and operational coding. Unfortunately,
integrative complexity, which may or may not be a great help to a profile of Bashar, is
beyond the scope of this paper in time and energy, and will have to be left to a future
project. The research on how integrative complexity can be used to forecast is taking
great strides, but is still nascent. It deserves increasing attention.
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Chapter II

Bashar Al-Assad has been characterized as one of the most interesting men in
power today. He has been called the Michael Corleone of the Middle East, because of the
prevailing wisdom of his reformist attitude. Mixed with the corrupting influence of a
crime family, and there is the tendency towards prevarication in whether or not the man
has been corrupted himself.
He is young, enigmatic and intelligent. Consider mixing that with his required
relations with the 'old guard' and his regime seems particularly thrilling. His father's path
to power is fairy tale-like given his humble origins, and in defiance of all odds Hafiz AlAssad was able to stay in power through a consolidation of his base of support, cunning,
chicanery, power moves and the situational factors. Bashar appears to have the same
intellectual faculties as his father, perhaps more, and his situation is both similar and
different. For these reasons, it is impossible to understand the decision-making potential
of a rationally-guided Syria simply by the situation. The situation will influence the man,
and the man will use both his father's legacy and his own intuition to respond to the
situation.
The leadership of Syria has revolved around the President for some time. Bashar,
however, is not the only player. He does not necessarily speak for the entire country, but
he is the dominant authority in Syria’s politics. While Syria's policy does revolve around
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him, there are elements of control which make the leadership role in Syria disjointed. It
is important to pull the various aspects of Syrian policy-making structures together, and
where it is difficult to do so, due to lack of information, it is important to assert how the
elements difficult to understand affect those which may be understood. This, of course,
refers to the ‘old guard’ or ‘invisible layer’ and is not meant to be vague, so much as it is
meant to give some direction to the insufficiencies inherent in this analysis.
In the theory section of this paper, an attempt has been made to give an adequate
understanding of the analysis of decision-making, in order to better understand the moves
which have an affect upon the interests of other countries. Though decision-making
analysis can be (roughly) divided into three parts (structural, institutional, and group), in
this particular case it may not be the best structure to attempt individual sections based on
these levels of analysis. This is for two reasons: First, it will undoubtedly lead to
different understandings (of course), and, as a result, call for different answers to the
questions posed. Second, each of the structures is interrelated. A clear picture won't be
had by only establishing how an institution, group or actor works.
That being said, however, all three models are used to explain key points in the
following analysis, including (though to a small extent) the tools acquired from group
decision making. RAM is seen most heavily in the section on situations. Model II can be
best seen in the sections on institutions as well as on the Allawi, Ba’ath and the Military.
As for Model III and bargaining theory, it is probably the most heavily used though
unsung hero of the following analysis. Any analysis which does not start with the
assumption that Bashar is a monolithic dictator must give credence to the forces in
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opposition to Bashar. How he chooses to affect the decision making process which isn’t
directly under his control is a key component of bargaining, and many factors go into it;
most obviously the human component.
The leader gets his advice from somewhere, which implies a group decisionmaking process. The group gets its beliefs and motives from somewhere, which implies
that there are other larger factors working behind the collection of individuals, as there
are other factors working behind each individual in perpetuity, changing but constant.
For example, in the United States it has long been held that the State Department is more
'dovish' than the Defense Department, which is more 'hawkish.' The institutional culture
affects the heads of these units, which have an affect on the group. Within the group, as
has been explained, political wrangling is had at all levels. Thus, a comprehensive look
at decision-making processes will first attempt to understand the institutions at work
within the different modes of society. Second, it will clarify the character of the
individual(s) who those institutions affect and how they are affected. Third, it will clarify
the psyche of the main decision maker and how he will be affected, and conversely, what
sorts of initiatives will be started by him/her as a result. Motivation amongst all these
levels is key. Understanding how multiple levels of action occur and interrelate will
provide a basis for understanding how decision works in Syria, more importantly as it
relates to Bashar.

Ethnicity, Society and War
Three key institutions of the Syrian political system are the Allawi, the Ba'ath, and
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the Military. This trifecta brings into focus the various interests at play in policy creation,
individual and group motivation, as well as the institutions themselves. Furthermore,
these three aspects of Syrian Society are integral to answering the question: Who is the
Old Guard? It is necessary to analyze all three in order to bring the answer into focus.
The Allawi are a minority group from northern Syria who are generally regarded
as being in the shi'a context of Islam. In 1946, the Allawi were a relatively autonomous
group. Syrian leaders at the time wanted a united country and attempted to integrate
them.113 Backlashes against integration lead to the Allawi being put down forcefully,
which included the execution of Allawi leadership.114 This laid the foundation for the
communal identity and solidarity we associate with the Allawi today, and set the context
for their later pull into Syrian politics. Due to their minority and repressed statuses, many
could only find jobs working as laborers for Sunni upper-class. Daniel Pipes' provocative
work sees the Allawi as being the core, or fundamental, aspect of the Syrian regime’s
character. He alludes to the mysticism and secretive nature of their culture and writes
about a concept known as Taqiya, meaning religious dissimulation. This refers to the
chameleon-like nature of the Allawi sect, in that they will say or do anything in order to
blend in.115 Pipes also documents the longtime discrimination of the Allawi, where even
the Sunni used the term 'Nusayri,' another word for Allawi, meaning pariah.116 Indeed,
since the Allawi considered themselves Muslims, mainstream Islam considered them
more blasphemous than other religions of the book, since they theoretically could attempt
to change Islam from within. For these reasons, Pipes sees the Allawi character as being
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the dominant aspect for the Syrian regime because of the years of repression and minority
solidarity. This would draw into question whether the Syrian leadership really cares
about other Arabs or other Muslims.
The Allawi luck began to change with the introduction of some of their members
into the Syrian officer corps, which was associated with the French. Due to the closeknit, tribal status of Syria's Allawi, preferential treatment became the norm in the
institutions discussed next; the Ba'ath and the military.
The Allawi became associated with both the Ba'ath and the Military when a
perfect storm created an opening within Syria for the ability of a minority to eventually
take, consolidate, and hold onto power. The storm developed when Allawi ties with
Syrian officers in the French Special Forces and the need of the French to focus on
recruitment from the more rural areas due to the perceived nationalism of the Sunni
caused more Allawi to get ahead in the military.117 The Ba'ath, an up and coming political
force, began appealing to rural areas also due to the non-sectarian pan-Arabism it
decreed. Its ideology had an undefined interest in social reform, anti-communism, and a
role in aiding rural denizens to gain status in the military.
Avraham Ben-Tzur describes the Ba’ath as a nationalist pan-Arab radicalism
blended with a moderate social program.118 There were most assuredly differences within
the Ba'ath party, which will be discussed later, but they were relatively small and based
on 'pace,' rather than ideology. A major pillar for the Ba'ath leading to this important
cohesive aspect was this: Equality was promised on the basis of being Arab, not on a
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sectarian identity associated with a major religious sect, like the Sunni.119 The trifecta
began to knit together strongly when Akram Hourani joined forces with the Ba'ath and
was instrumental in pulling the officers to their side of the national struggle.120 Michael
Aflaq, a founder of Ba'athism, later saw the increasing strength of the military within the
Ba’athist party as abhorrent. He found himself in opposition to Syrian Ba'athists when he
remarked that they had corrupted its original intent due to the infusion of the military into
its decision making structure.121
The growing weight of the military in the Ba'ath structure helped keep it alive
during a crucial part of Syrian history: the UAR period. The United Arab Republic was
an alliance of Syria and Egypt which had a major impact on socialist policy. Land reform
during this period struck a major blow against the old bourgeoisie; the ruling elite from
1946 to the late 50's.122 In fact, before 1958, there was more or less a system of free
enterprise in which agriculture was semi-feudal and obviously exploitative but the
industrial sector was basically free.123 The UAR period changed this system, with
redistribution of land and the nationalization of banks, insurance companies and full, as
well as partial, nationalization of industrial firms.124 One policy actually mandated that
the majority of political parties shut down. This forced the Ba'ath underground, and a
number of Syrian officers, specifically Salah Jadid, Hafiz Al-Assad, Muhammad Umran
and Hamad Ubayd were transferred to Egypt. They stayed remarkably organized, and as
a result were able to come back to Syria with a large advantage compared to other parties
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at the close of the UAR period.125 The end of the UAR period was heralded by the flight
of capital, loss of jobs, and the declining as well as high cost of production.126
The phase of civilian rule only lasted for a few years after the UAR, and could not
reverse the socialist decrees. What is referred to as the traditional Ba'ath period came
about as a result of a coup in March 1963.127 The Ba’ath were interested in a socialist
system heavily embedded within an Arab framework. This system was harsh and
involved ceilings on landownership and a peasant's union. Credit dried up, there were
consequences for industry, re-nationalization occurred in the banks and the state exerted
heavy control in general. Hafiz Al-Assad was associated with membership of the original
leadership, such as President Amin Al-Hafiz, during its struggle with Salah Jadid and the
new Ba'ath. This struggle was mainly drawn along ideological lines: Should Arab unity
come before (traditionalists) or after (radical) economic development? The radical
Ba’ath chose more nationalizations and economic reforms, and the traditionalists
attempted to stop it.128 A bloody coup occurred on February 23rd, 1966.
The new government’s policies were meant to weaken the hold of the traditional
elites and end heavy handed western influence in the country, though not necessarily to
break ties with them.129 There began to be some leeway for private enterprise at the end
of 1965, though this mainly halted in 1966 with the beginning of the radical Ba'ath
phase.130 The specifics of economic nationalization include the following: diligence in
upholding agrarian reform laws; nationalization of the oil industry, including export
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mechanisms; and the expropriation of firms, both small and large. Nationalization
became the word of the day.131 A new strata of industrialists emerged as a result of the
reforms. Crucial to the new industrialists were their small numbers and, specifically,
their unwillingness or inability to get involved in Syrian politics like the traditional
elite.132 Due to this unwillingness, the state bourgeoisie began to grow as the public
sector grew ever bigger, fostering the market for the new industrialists who controlled the
surplus of publicly-owned production.133
A new phase characterized by a more liberal Ba’ath party sought a middle ground
with the peasants, helped the Allawi move up in the world by granting land to them in the
plain of al-Ghab, and allowed some limited consolidation of land – something not
normally allowed in the more heavy socialist atmospheres. Aziz-al Ahsan argues that AlAssad only changed a small part of agriculture in order to broaden his base of support.134
The industrial and commercial sectors, however, changed to a large degree. Threefourths of the investment in industry was in the public sector after 1970.135 Private
manufacturing had shown little growth, and what growth there has been was in
“economically less-productive activities.” Further, the private sector was little more than
a third of the economy in imports and 40% of exports.136 Import controls relaxed slightly,
and to a small extent a new open-door policy was pursued regarding foreign investment.
Ahsan wrote in 1984 that Syria was socialist but with some opportunities for investment.
Specifically, he wrote that there has been a failure in Syrian policy to “utilize domestic
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private and foreign capital for more productive purposes” because of “instability...a lack
of trust among both foreign and local entrepreneurs over long-term investments...[a] lack
of firm guarantees from the government...[and] criticism and protest from the left and
lower-middle salaried classes whose incomes did not rise in proportion to inflation.”137
After 1973, the newest strata or 'commercial class' began the slow, inevitable slide
towards corruption. This class used their connections to make big deals. Small in
number, this class revolved around its relation to the state and the pursuit of large profit
(sometimes by illegal means or exemptions to the rules given the state), and
monopolies.138 This class became the model for private-state cooperation. Decree #10,
an attempt to deal with the phenomenon, gave more of a stake to the state, but also ended
up exempting the companies from many rules and taxes.139 In many respects, this class
still exists as a function of state-enterprise cooperation, monopolization, and exploitation.
The Ba’ath, Allawi and Military exist in the bargaining construct as institutions
which share power. This is the first principle of bargaining. In the Ba’ath we have an
informal power with heavy influence in the formal structures of government. The Allawi
are again informal, with heavy influence in the formal structures of the military. The
military has held its relation to both since the days of the United Arab Republic, and
members of all three cross and interweave to form the shadowy base layer that obfuscates
the powerful analysis of even the most veteran Syria watchers. All three groups form an
alliance based on need, interest and history.
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Some Historical Perspective
Analysts of Syria commonly refer to an 'old guard,' conjuring up images of a
hobbled veteran standing in the wings ready to defend an outmoded method of thinking.
Because the old guard still exists, a brief look at the politics and social movements
affecting the coup which brought Hafiz Al-Assad to power will lay the foundation for an
understanding of the motivation of this influential anachronism. They are in some ways a
group, but there is less cohesive authority and structure than one would find in typical
groups. They exist as a set of individuals with a common history and shared principles,
interests, and terrors. This section will be offset by a later delineation of the more
difficult features which the 'new guard' (for lack of a better term) has to approach.
Civilian members of the Ba'athist leadership were, for all intents and purposes,
subordinated to the military leadership. Indeed, as mentioned earlier one of Aflaq's major
criticisms was the military's dominance in the halls of Ba'athist leadership. The Ba'athist
civilian leadership, after the original founders had been thrown into exile, was forced to
subordinate behind the officer caste.140 Salah Jadid was the dominant name in
military/party politics. By way of his different positions over a long period of time, he
was “admirably placed to orchestrate the cross postings, nepotisms and dismissals of
army officers by means of which (as he already knew from his own bitter experience)
opposition could be hamstrung.”141 Martin Seymour further contends that it was for the
murder of a favorite that Jadid held a grudge against the old leaders of the Ba'ath and the
Syrian Communist Party, as well as 'all things Unionist,' an allusion to an earlier Syrian
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leadership. This led to Seymour's belief that “the power struggle in Syria [was] inspired
by revanchisme on the part of the sectarian minorities, resentful of the millennial
domination of the country by the Sunni majority and nostalgic for the periods of virtual
autonomy they have occasionally enjoyed....”142 Seymour also understands the
contention that there was a social basis to the Alawite rise.143 A social explanation would
have taken into account the poor upbringing of most Alawites; the oppression by the
notables, which in this case would have made it happenstance that they were Sunni, and
the utilization of an economic/class conflict style of reasoning. Further complicating
things, is the possibility that there was an ideological basis for the rise of Alawite coup
politics.144 Seymour isn't sure of this, since he believes the Ba'ath split during the coup
years was one of pace and timing, as mentioned earlier, and this may be true.145
However, ideology definitely played a role as a factor within the highly complicated
structure of class status and sectarianism.
According to Hafiz Al-Assad's own history, he became a student leader at a very
young age. At 16, Al-Assad joined the Ba'ath party under Dr. Wahib Al-Ghanim – the
prime mover of Ba'athism in Latakia – and quickly rose to become a student leader.146 At
such an early age, it is undoubted that his time in the Ba'ath party must have created a
strong resonance with Al-Assad of the pillars of the party; namely political secularism
and economic socialism. Indeed, the main rivals in the town he went to school in,
Latakia, were the Muslim Brotherhood with which he got into a number of altercations.147
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Even here, however, the trichotomy of ideology, sectarianhood, and class standing rears
its ugly head. The Muslim Brotherhood's ideology was obviously strictly Islamic, which
clashed with the secularism of the Ba'ath. Further, “In Latakia the Muslim Brothers were
allied to the wealthy conservative Muslim families who ran the town and sent their sons
to the school that Asad attended.”148 This indicates both an influence of class structure at
an early age, as well as sectarianism, since the Muslim Brotherhood was (and remains)
Sunni. Other examples in Hafiz Al-Assad's young life also hint at this relationship. For
instance, it is likely that he wanted to become a doctor, however, for a man of his social
background, which had links to his religion, this was unlikely to occur. As a result, he
did what a number of other Alawites in the same boat did: they attempted to fill the void
left in the wake of the departing French by joining the military. We can understand the
link when we see what Patterson saw: “Since wealthy families steered their sons away
from military careers, poor boys from minority backgrounds were able to rise to positions
of authority in the army.”149
The Alawites are a group only recently made privileged and many still remember
the fight which it took to create that status. They did not become privileged until they
took advantage of a string of good luck and situational factors which placed them into the
institutions capable of creating their privileged status. The Ba'ath and the military were
places for young minorities to get ahead in the world. This is evidenced by the ideology
of the Ba'ath which allowed minority Alawites of poor backgrounds to gain an
established place in the world. That this was garnered through a commitment to ideology
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rather than failed uprisings is simply a byproduct of their new legitimacy. It is also
evidenced by the case of the military and the departing French. The Ba'ath members
made some very solid maneuvers, such as keeping themselves strong during the UAR
period, and the Alawites were in a fantastic position to put other religious minorities into
positions of power through the use of the military, which they accomplished with finesse,
something they wouldn't have been able to do without the general disregard for the
military which the majority held.
Pipes' concern that the Syrian leadership is for the most part Alawite is a neat way
of explaining why Pipes believes that they are primarily about retaining power as a
minority status.

Raymond Hinnebusch remarks with some disdain that this analysis is

colored by Pipes' own goals with regard to foreign policy. Hinnebusch himself writes
that “most experienced Syria-watchers would view this interpretation of Asad's objectives
as an untenable oversimplification; certainly stronger cases have been made that policymaking is driven by other factors, such as Asad's nationalist reaction to the Israeli threat
(Patrick Seale), class interests (Volker Perthes), or state interests (Hinnebusch).”150 The
truth is ardently subject to each of these analyses, and a more nuanced approach. As
Mahmud A. Faksh writes about the social/cultural movement of some mountain and
lowland Alawis into an achievement-oriented focus (i.e. the army and party): “The
transition, however, does not necessarily entail a complete dissociation from traditional
values and primordial feelings about the family, tribe or religious group, but rather a
lessening in level of commitment.”151 Unless an individual is extremely disciplined, the
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advent of different structures on one's conscience will undoubtedly create new sets of
interests and loyalties.
While many individuals have had access to Hafiz Al-Assad, few have written as
much about him as Patrick Seale. As noted above, Seale's understanding of Al-Assad's
motivations and policy decisions is placed firmly in the light of the conflict with Israel.
There is certainly ample evidence to support this conclusion, most notably the idea that
Al-Assad took personal responsibility for the loss of the Golan Heights. Seale was an
active participant in the peace process, which gives him a unique, but perhaps slightly
biased view. Nevertheless, Syrian-Israeli relations are heavily important to Syrian
decision-making.
In 1973, when Al-Assad attempted to retake the Golan Heights, the Egyptians did
not help matters much by refusing to push harder on their border with Israel. Al-Assad
felt betrayed. It is widely understood now that Sadat's intention had never been to win by
war, but rather to place himself in a more advantageous position diplomatically. The
Israelis were able to focus on the Syrian front, eventually driving the Syrians to within
miles of Damascus. In much the same way, Al-Assad was pulled into the peace process
in the 90's with a firm commitment on Golan Heights withdrawal from Prime Minister
Rabin, albeit with stipulated conditions of a severe nature. The president of Syria did not
reject them, however. He responded back with what Secretary Warren Christopher of the
United States, the intermediary, regarded as a positive response.152 Rabin, however,
would not hear anything of it. The offer was a ruse while the Israelis moved forward
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with Oslo without interference from Syria.153 These instances highlight a number of
issues: First, the importance of the Golan Heights to Hafiz Al-Assad. Second, they show
the mentality towards trust in others that Al-Assad developed over time. The Palestinians
were moving on their own, as were the Jordanians in 1994. His world must have looked
very bleak towards the end of the late 90's as “it looked very much as if Syria was facing
a new and threatening axis made up of Israel, Turkey, Jordan, and the United States.”154
Arab/Muslim solidarity was no longer a real option.
Seale's view of Al-Assad's foreign policy is one of containment.155 Hafiz AlAssad's deepening distrust for the international environment has led him towards Iran and
towards sponsorship of what the international community views as terrorism. His use of
Palestinian rejectionist groups and proxies in Lebanon has been to keep Israel from
normalizing relations with all of its neighbors. Just like Vietnam in itself wasn't
necessarily the goal when the USSR and the United States squared off; so Lebanon in
itself isn't necessarily the goal in the proxy war between Israel and Syria. Certainly,
control of Lebanon was important, both from the viewpoint that control gives to two rival
powers looking to one-up one another, and also from the viewpoint that the Lebanese
economy actually matters to Syria, or acts as a buffer state for Israel. To Al-Assad, the
taking of the Golan, Sheba Farms, and vast tracts of the Sinai must have looked very
much like expansion; the settlements in the territories were expansionary; and the rhetoric
was expansionary. To Al-Assad, Operation Peace in Galilee in 1982 was “to give Israel a
free hand to absorb the West Bank...kicking Syria out of Lebanon, and drawing that
153
154
155

Seale, 68
Seale and Butler, 28
Seale and Butler, 27

57

country into its own sphere of influence under a Maronite vassal.156 Operation Grapes of
Wrath in 1996 was similar: “destroy Hizballah (or pressure Syria into disarming it), wrest
Lebanon out of Syria's orbit, and deprive Syria of its regional influence.”157 In Seale's
view, containment is the obvious choice for Al-Assad, where first he tried strategic parity,
and when that didn't work due to factors like Israeli luck/skill in wars and the USSR
folding, he tried to push for a comprehensive peace. The Madrid Peace Conference, the
Rabin offer, and even the Gulf war can be taken as signs of this.
The impression that Hafiz Al-Assad has moved enthusiastically towards peace is
nonetheless a false one. He has been cautious in power ever since he refused to send his
air force into Jordan, precipitating a conflict between himself and Salah Jadid. Whether
his true motivation was containment of Israel or a return of the Golan, he nonetheless
passed on a series of policy decisions to his son that look very close to the tenets of a
realist. This is not to say that Syria's intentions or motivations are easily understood:
Syria is one of the more secretive regimes on the planet. However, it does mean that with
some amount of solid information we can make reasonable guesswork should we
eliminate or clarify some of the variables. These variables are important and consist of
the context of past decisions, which is discussed in this section, bureaucratic decisionmaking and institutional relevance, discussed in the sections on the Ba’ath, Allawi and
Military. Bargaining amongst power players and a look at group politics are discussed
later, and leadership psyche is discussed in the final section. We can understand these
through examples ranging from the beginning of Hafiz’s tenure to the current period.
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Seale’s containment theory is a good start to begin understanding Hafiz from a
realist perspective. Bashar Al-Assad did not start from a clean slate. He inherited his
father's country and his father's policies, which were derived from a certain perspective.
According to Raymond Hinnebusch, the father may be described as the quintessential
rational actor as defined by realist tenets.158 As a result, he does what he believes is
within the best interests of the nation. He has been uniquely situated to take unpopular
positions in foreign policy due mainly to two reasons. First, his cult of personality status
stems from the general public being largely obsessed with him. They held him up, not as
public servant, but as a monarch or king. He was popularly loved. Second, his
concentration of power within the figurehead of the presidency.159 “He concentrated
power in a virtually monarchical presidency through a strategy of balancing rival regime
pillars and social forces.”160 Hinnebusch argues Al-Assad's strategy in domestic politics
has allowed himself to run as uninhibited a foreign policy as there may exist. The Ba'ath
party broke the power of the dominant classes, but imposed its own set of values;
eventually broken by Al-Assad's control of the army. The bourgeoisie was pacified by
liberalization, while dissident groups who challenged the regime were violently
repressed.161 As a result, his hold on foreign policy “is not subject to bureaucratic politics
where hawkish or dovish factions must be consulted and can veto Asad's
decisions...There are certain domestic constraints on the president but they are indirect:
Political wisdom dictates that Asad take account of the domestic consequences of his
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foreign policy decisions.”162 Decisions like his hold on Lebanon, continued intransigence
towards Israeli peace, and Palestinian rights.
At first glance, one might conclude that since Bashar inherited his father's regime,
he too would fall into the same circumstances. The father, however, had a greater lock on
the institutions and power mechanisms of government and society. Many of the same
problems still face Syria, but Bashar's personal situation is much changed. The domestic
couch he sits on is of a different color and fabric. He has to take into account the more
powerful elements in Syria associated with the old guard, which, despite the peaceful
transition from father to son, nevertheless took some of the power. And yet a part of
Bashar's requirements for legitimacy impel him towards the policies of his father. He is
thus caught between his tendency towards some degree of reform, and the needs required
to stay in power, combined with a prominent position in the Middle East. This sets the
stage for a difficult and intriguing dynamic.

“Qa'idna, Mithalna, Amalna”
Bashar's origins are in some cases highly transparent and a matter of public
record, and in other cases a virtual morass of opinion and dark corners. He was born the
middle child of five, with an older brother and sister, Basil and Bushra, and two younger
brothers, Majid and Mahir. He grew up more in the academic model than in the heir
apparent model, went to Medical school at Damascus University in 1982, served out his
military service as an army doctor after graduating in 1988, and moved to the United
Kingdom in 1992 for postgraduate work in ophthalmology at Western Eye Hospital. In
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1994, Bashar's older brother Basil died in a car crash outside Damascus International
Airport. Bashar returned to Syria, was integrated into the army, and began an upwards
track of promotion. He went through a course for tank battalion commanders, was
promoted to major in early 1995, enrolled at the Higher Military Academy in 1996 and
graduated with honors in mid-1997. Bashar was then promoted to lieutenant colonel and
put in the same position as his brother had been in; commander of an elite Republican
Guard brigade. In 1999, Bashar was promoted to staff colonel.163
Hafiz Al-Assad died on June 10th, 2000, and Bashar's transition to the Presidency
was practically seamless. Though the moves the government took behind the scenes are
largely opaque, the show of support by key individuals is indicative of continued loyalty,
as is the replacement of key individuals throughout the government just prior to the elder
Assad's death. For example, Bashar began “appearing at military ceremonies and events
with Defense Minister Mustafa Tlas.”164 Lieutenant General 'Ali Aslan, deputy chief of
staff, was supportive of Bashar as he carried out military maneuvers alongside the top
brass of the Syrian Military.165 Major General 'Ali Haydar, chief of the special forces,
was replaced in 1994 after coming out in opposition to any hereditary succession, and
Major General 'Adnan Makhluf resigned after a falling out with Bashar.166 In 1998, Rifa't
Al-Assad was dismissed as second vice-president. Flynt Leverett sees a similar
restructuring to make way for Bashar in the intelligence and security agencies: Major
General Bashir Najjar, head of the General Intelligence Directorate (GID) was replaced
by General 'Ali Khuri in mid 1998, two officers close to Bashar in the military “were
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placed in charge of the directorate's internal and external branches,” and supposedly came
to eventually overcome in influence their superior; Major General Muhammad Nassif.167
Loyal members of the family, like Bushra's husband, were elevated quickly.
The way Syrians view the succession versus how the outside world views it was
highlighted by David W. Lesch. Though Leverett hits greater depths to Syrian society,
power politics, and arguably even Bashar himself, Lesch nonetheless garnered a close
insight to the character of the Syrian president through multiple interviews. He was able
to speak with Bashar, and his wife Asma, as well as do interviews with a number of
individuals close to the family. Though there isn't a strong denunciation of the thought
that there may be succession of father to son, it just doesn't seem to have been discussed.
The death of his brother appeared to be a wake up call whereby, according to Bashar, he
experienced the possibility that he could help individuals, and that he could fight
corruption, as more and more of Syria's people looked to him for guidance. However, a
most telling example for the argument that Bashar was being groomed came a year after
Basil's death, when pictures of the martyred son began to be replaced with a targeted
campaign involving Hafiz', Basil's, and Bashar's pictures that read: Qa'idna, Mithalna,
Amalna, or “our leader, our ideal, and our hope.”168 Flynt Leverett's analysis of
performance and speech in the early period of Bashar’s grooming is an example of an
evolving acceptance of his role following the return to Syria. Leverett asserts that his
performance was “frequently lackluster and uncommitted” but changed to become
“increasingly interested in his duties and committed to the tasks ahead” by the late
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1990s.169
Two key interests for Bashar before his assuming the presidency were his work on
corruption and his having been handed the vaunted ‘Lebanon File.’ The corruption
campaign was an overt attempt to enable the institutions of the government to work in a
more ideal manner, eliminating government fraud and waste. It is likely, however, that it
was also a smokescreen to rid the government of those not amenable to a succession,
such as the aforementioned head of he GID who was imprisoned on corruption charges,
and Mahmud Al-Zu'bi, a man Bashar was able to get replaced during his father's rule with
his future first prime minister: Mustafa Miru.170 It also allowed Bashar to be viewed
positively by the public in a campaign for an issue that was important to them. With
respect to his other major duty, Lebanon has been widely heralded as economically
crucial to Syria, as well as being the all important proxy arena in Syria's status as spoiler
and the greater battle with Israel. That Bashar was entrusted with the operations and
policies for Lebanon is a testament to his continuing moves up the governmental ladder.

A Discussion of Syria's Institutions
Hafiz Al-Assad kept to his pragmatic ways in his decision to cater to the masses
by implementing what Volker Perthes refers to as a 'consultative, quasi-corporatist'
strategy of combining a response to the need for openness and participation in
government with the requirement that the state function as a means of addressing needs
for people.171 As a result, in the 1990's there was a small push for more independents in
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parliament; an institution with little legislative power but which serves its purpose to the
regime to identify the needs of their local constituencies, and to build connections
amongst themselves and others in the vast bureaucracy. They are an attempt by the
government to form action channels for its citizens by taking advantage of policy
entrepreneurs with a strong desire to make local change. However, they have little actual
legislative power due to a variety of reasons. The most important of these reasons is the
implementation of Article 113, which gives the President broad, overarching and absolute
powers in the case of national emergency. This article has been invoked since 1960.172
The People's Assembly is an institution which lends credence to the critique that AlAssad placates with a thin veneer of legitimacy, since the people have a very limited
check on the Presidency regarding legislation. Regarding legitimacy, the People's
Assembly would have little determining factor in a bargaining model that pitted the
legislative and executive branches against one another. As a result, the first principle has
very little weight here. However, that does not mean it lacks legitimacy elsewhere.
Bureaucracy is a necessary institution in any modern society, but in Syria it
represents an arduous and cumbersome creature, morass-like in its speed and ridiculous
in its utilization of red tape. Individuals at the lowest levels of society, for
entrepreneurial activities or even traveling, must get permission from the highest levels of
the bureaucracy. Indeed, Volker Perthes argues that even the lower level employees of
the bureaucracy, rather than making decisions themselves, will often punt the decision to
superiors rather than take the risk of doing something wrong.173 This has led to a culture
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of indecisive decision-makers. There is, however, an indirect connection here between
the bureaucratic framework and the invisible layer of decision manipulators. The
corruption caused by the latter often creates and/or takes advantage of the corruption
within the former. As a result, Bashar's central role in corruption fighting prior to his
Presidency was meant to get rid of his competition/detractors, and stabilize his base of
support. Later, during his Presidency, the need to reform the bureaucracy through the use
of both training and advisors became a two-pronged assault designed to give him more
latitude in decision-making. The fourth principle of bargaining would indicate that
Bashar utilized this method to secure his own goals, even if it is a blunt description of
‘bargaining.’ This is also an example in usurpation of the rational-legal authority in favor
of a short-lived charismatic authority in the form of the leader. Power will eventually
transfer back to the former authority, but when, at what cost and with what amount of
legitimacy will be correlated directly with Bashar’s ability to work the Syrian system.
Perthes identifies a disconnect after Hafiz Al-Assad's presidency; a break in which
the son required more power to be put directly into his hands due to his own peculiar
traits. Despite the oft-heard analysis of Bashar that he maintains his father's legacy, he is
not his father. Hafiz himself took power away from the party by way of his charisma and
personal leadership. According to Perthes, Bashar is doing it by building up the state
institutions and requiring that the Ba'ath party take a backseat.174 This is an example of
Bashar attempting to regulate the complexity of joint action seen on two of the three
spokes on the Syrian wheel of power. In other words, he uses his own authoritative
legitimacy to push lawful institutions at the expense of traditional powers.
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Perthes identification of the Syrian regime's modus operandi is a credit to his
writing: the role of the state institution is to foster development in a cause which the
President has deemed doable, namely updating and modernizing the economic practices
of Syria. All manner of critics in the regime want him to reform the authoritarian
practices of his government, but this is not in his cards.175 The regime has highlighted
change in one area, in the context of staying the same in another. The effect is the
underwriting of stability given the unique circumstances of an invisible layer, in a move
that pushes slowly towards the dissolution of their power. For Bashar, as it was for Hafiz,
it is a game of gradual and measured steps.
The men really affecting Bashar's ability to govern, either positively or negatively,
do so primarily in the context of the reform vs. conservative movement. There are, as
mentioned, a number of other variables including the sectarian and ideological ones.
These lines follow the traditional Allawi need for safety and security, and the Ba'athist
requirement of socialism within an Arab nationalist context. However, because of the
perceived status of Bashar as a reformer, sides have hardened along the aforementioned
old guard vs. new guard (Bashar appointees) lines: what some business profiles refer to
as the visible vs. invisible layer. As a result, we see moves like at the Ba'athist regional
conference where it was publicly stated that the Ba'ath party would take a smaller role in
public governance, and we see elements of what has been popularly referred to as the
merchant-military nexus; a coalition of Sunni businessmen and Allawi military who keep
one another wealthy and strong.
The Ba'ath and merchant-military nexus are still institutions which must be dealt
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with. The Ba'ath party appoints Ministers of Parliament rather than electing them. In
addition, the Ba'ath as an institution represents “an assembly of party dignitaries: the
heads of all important mass organizations; additional members of the Trade Union
Federation and the Peasant Union executives; the prime minister; other members of the
party's regional and national commands; some provincial governors; and some artists and
journalists,” as well as the occasional professor.176 This has been a solid tool for the
Assads to control what Perthes refers to as the active elements of civil society.177 The
Ba'ath has always been the major party in Syria, as the figurative head of the National
Progressive Front, a group of left leaning parties with officially approved status. They
are an institution with some formal power, and a great deal of informal power. Reflecting
the second principle of bargaining having to do with informal power, Bashar’s ability to
handle (or not handle) the Ba’ath will have a direct affect upon his ability to make gains
for his agenda in Syria.
More informally strong, the merchant-military nexus was cultivated by Hafiz AlAssad in an attempt not to weaken the power of the Allawi, but rather to strengthen the
base of his support to include the traditional Sunni merchant class. This institution is one
which is heavily tied into that of the military, with each keeping the other strong, wealthy
and with a comfortable modicum of power. It doesn't have ties to the old guard in so
much as it is intermeshed with the old guard. This layer is the network of power nobles
with influence, the base of support first for the father, and now for the son. It is an
obfuscated layer, a hazy layer which simultaneously backs the new President and opposes
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him. It is a charged energy combining the domestic push-and-pull with the
conglomerated interests of position, power, wealth and authority. These interests often
conflict on multiple levels. For example, it is in the interest of the Sunni merchants to
support Bashar because he represents continuity, but it is also in their interest to oppose
what are often viewed as his more reform-minded acts or appointments.
The institutions will not always be there, or necessarily continue to put up with
their perception of a reform-minded President. Faiza R. Rais states:

The paradox being that a fundamental change in Syria produced by economic and
political reforms will undermine the very elements of power in Syria (the army,
security services, Ba'ath party and the political and economic elites) that sustain the
regime. At the same time stability-ensuring mechanisms that [Hafiz] Assad put in
place are fast running out of steam in the face of the fast-paced developments
affecting the region as a whole and impacting on Syria as well.178

Rais maintained that it was actually Hafiz Al-Assad's personality that kept things in
place, rather than “'deep-rooted political traditions.'”179 Rais didn't deny the existence of
power structures, however, and instead attempted to figure out whether or not Bashar has
indeed been able to maneuver within those same institutions which his father had been
able to control so well. Rais' conclusion is that in the case of Bashar, the system rather
than the man seems to be more dominant. It is more the case of a man working through
the system, rather than the man controlling the system outright. The application of a
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bargaining model would have strong significance in this regard, if it weren’t for a major
lack of transparency and openness in Syria. Rais mentions this dichotomy in somewhat
the same way one would speak about a two-party system. There are the formal structures
of the “presidency, cabinet, the People's assembly, the Baath party, and the informal state
structures in the background that in effect are the main decision-making centres i.e. the
security services, the Republican Guard and individuals who serve as advisors to
Bashar.”180 The Alawites head all four security services. The Republican Guard has
traditionally been the protector of the dominant regime; and the 'Inner Circle' is made up
of those surrounding Bashar Al-Assad. It is these structures which Bashar must deal with
in order to wield the same level of power as his father.
There are issues with defining the elements of bargaining in the Syrian politicalpower system. The invisible layer is one of those, and is thus called because of Syria's
heavy authoritarian status. Though there has been a loosening to some degree recently in
the ability of journalists to get and spread information, the regime is highly circumspect
in its transparency and release of information: “An outsider looking in would find Syria
to be one of the most inscrutable countries in the world.”181 However, we can attempt to
identify some of these players, and in addition can define the strategies Bashar uses (and
likely uses behind the scenes) to bargain, as well as establish control and effective power.
This primarily revolves around his dealings with actual people who make up the
aforementioned institutions.
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Lesser Players and What They Mean for Syria
Bargaining takes form in many ways and for many reasons. Regarding the second
principle of bargaining, we may look upon Bashar’s abilities to place individuals in key
positions of power as a test of his political ability. Individual regime loyalists and foes
are a strong part of the Syrian system. Prime Minister Mustafa Miro was appointed in
early 2000 and was considered somewhat conservative in orientation, but was
nonetheless close to Bashar. There is some evidence that Bashar wanted to make him a
Vice-President, but the job ended up falling to Khaddam after the old guard exerted their
influence. Miro and his technocrats apparently did the job that the President had little
understanding of: reforming institutions of government. All the while his was a job of
attempting to please both President and those of the 'invisible layer.'182 Ultimately, his
government was criticized for the slow pace of reform, though this may have had quite a
deal to do with Dr. Muhammad Al-Hussain, a conservative loyalist who opposed a
number of reforms wanted by the IMF and World Bank.183 Miro was replaced by
Muhammad Naji Al-Utri, a former speaker of parliament and a Ba'ath party fixture.
While Al-Utri is considered to be a firm advocate for reform, the pace is still measured.
He is viewed as a compromise “between old guard party loyalists and the supporters of
political and economic modernization.”184 This compromise exemplifies the continued
back and forth struggle for control in the governmental politics process.
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Indicating the third principle in bargaining, the final pieces in Bashar's transition
to President occurred when Defense Minister Tlas and Vice President Khaddam “called
the generals and key figures in the mukhabarat [intelligence organization] to make sure
everything was secure before announcing Bashar's 'candidacy.'”185 In this case, the key
for communication here is the intelligence and defense apparatus, and the carriers are
those powerful individuals who were on Bashar’s side; namely members of the old guard
looking to protect their entrenched position.
This line of communication has been perpetuated through the path of lineage.
The Defense Minister's son, Manaf Tlas, along with Bashar's brother, Mahir Al-Assad,
are both now leaders of the Republican Guard, the most elite fighting unit in Syria.186
Khaddam's son is close to Bashar. However, his father only a few years ago left his post
and his command in the Ba'ath party, then broke with his former government and
implicated it in the murder of Rafik Hariri.187 The replacing of Khaddam was part of a
general shake-up of the old guard. Asef Shawkat, the husband of Bushra Al-Assad, now
Bashar's brother-in-law, was confirmed in 2005 as the head of military intelligence.
Bassam Haddad believes that the heads of General Security, Military Security and the
Republican Guard are the most powerful positions in the country, and thus changes
indicate the level at which both the reformers and conservatives wax and wane, with a
major purge since 2000 of men considered anti-Bashar.188 This is an example of Bashar
utilizing the means he has available to influence his personal group’s ‘guest list;’ placing
individuals of trust into positions of power over institutions, giving them the enhanced
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legitimacy that is required of a marriage between charismatic and rational-legal authority,
or the power of personality over laws and bureaucracy. This is an example of the
supreme faith that institutions matter, but that people can be united with those same
institutions to create a country’s changing apparatus. This was Bashar’s attempt to gain
greater control over institutions through the use of individuals at the group level.
Haddad’s nuanced conclusion is that the old guard is making way for the new
guard. While we may treat this as prudent analytical speculation, the nomenclature is
deceptive. Those surrounding Bashar should probably not be described as a reformminded group first and foremost, so much as one based around preservation of the
dominant Ba'ath/Allawi/merchant-military complex legacies. Some individuals more
than likely are truly reform minded, and shake-ups continue to occur regularly. The
power involved with shake-ups is an example of Bashar’s formal power in the context of
bargaining’s fourth principle. Namely that Bashar is intending to have an effect upon the
general discourse by exercising his ability to make changes; at the head of figurehead
institutions, in the leadership positions of groups, or in major organizations.
A recent shake-up was made notable in April of 2009 by the placement of a
woman, Kawkab al-Sabah Dayeh, at the head of the new Environmental Ministry. Other
major changes include Saeed Sammur's (a former intelligence officer) taking over of the
position of Interior Minister – notable because the man who was replaced was Bassam
Abdel Majeed, a major General who graduated from the Air Force Academy. Judge
Ahmad Yunis took over as Minister of Justice.189 Yunis headed the controversial
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Economic Security Courts, which fell under the emergency executive powers law and
heard cases of financial crime but did not safeguard victim’s rights.190 These are
examples of the push-pull in politicking that consistently searches for a meld of
institutions with particular personalities.

Situations, Causal Attributes/Abilities, and Rationality
The situational perspective deserves discussion for three reasons. First, a look at
how situations have been handled in the past can give insight into the thinking of the
Syrian decision-making process. Second, the saliency of many of these past situations is
still high. They have yet to be fully resolved, have changed in what may be described as
a small manner, or have direct implications for current issues. Third and most important,
situations are the best avenue to view rational actor model, since they hint at why
countries balance, their value is seen in their decisions, and conclusions can be made
about rationality.
When Bashar took office, the situational climate did not reset or change overnight
simply because of the new personality. Indeed, the political climate was made even more
conservative by the fact that the foreign policy advisorship did not change much. The
domestic system, on the other hand, was Bashar's first attempt at reform. Both the
domestic and the foreign have implications for an analysis of Bashar Al-Assad; these may
be seen in how the President affects policy, and why, and how the President is acted upon
by external stimuli, permitting a glimpse of his leadership style in how he chooses to
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react, frame and set the agenda.
Since Hafiz Al-Assad has already been discussed to some respect as a valid model
for rational acting, let us now consider the case of the son in a more comprehensive light.
First, the situational characteristics have changed in the decade since his death, but only
in certain circumstances. The first test of the RAM method is an understanding of its
relevance from a balance of power perspective. Syria’s needs in this type of system have
not been greatly altered. It is true that Iraq is not the powerful player it once was, and
Saudi Arabia’s power as a heavy weight is continuing to rise, but Syria’s balancing
remains in opposition to Israel. Syria holds onto alliances with Iran, and through Iran,
Hizbullah, for just such a purpose. Lebanon remains a traditional battleground in the war
between the two. As a result, a more in-depth review of the tenuous balance Syria
attempts to maintain in the region is warranted.
Eyal Zisser wrote in 2001 about the Lebanon-Syria-Israel Triangle, where he
believed the most “important developments in the last year have occurred.”191 The
inherited situation saw the Geneva summit fail to make good on Syrian-Israeli peace. An
Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon escalated anti-Syrian rhetoric, as did Hafiz'
death.192 This was due largely to the backlash against a power vacuum which never really
came to fruition, but was expected nonetheless. Zisser explains that the negotiations in
the 1990's were able to at least allow the possibility of peace to be ushered in. Given
these developments, along with Bashar's honeymoon period outside Syria as a potential
reform leader, the climate in 2001 was one of possible change and heightened (though not
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in all cases) expectation.
Syria and Lebanon, as two points on the triangle the Israelis desperately want to
keep apart, have had a long and contorted history together. Brought into Syria at the
request of the Lebanese leadership during the Lebanese civil war in the 1970's, they
stayed, rhetorically to keep the peace, but also for nationalistic, economic and sphere-ofinfluence reasons. These include a sentiment of brotherly partnership in maintaining the
idea of a 'Greater Syria,' economic integration between the two countries, and the need to
continue its proxy battle with Israel over Palestine, the Golan Heights and the Sheba
Farms. Syrian presence was felt for a long time throughout the country, but after a series
of limited withdrawals, their military was relegated primarily to the Beka'a Valley.
Syrian presence nevertheless remains elsewhere, in the form of the intelligence services,
Lebanese allies, and Hizbullah.
The assassination of Rafik Hariri is understandably the major developmental point
in Syrian-Lebanese relations during Bashar's presidency. Hariri was the primary
opposition to Emile Lahoud's extra-constitutional extension as President, which Syria
was pushing for. As a result, Syria was the prime suspect when Hariri was killed in a
massive explosion on February 14th, 2005.

Denials were extensive on the part of both

Syria and Syria's Lebanese allies. David Lesch believes that Bashar did not have a hand
in the assassination. He writes, “I suspect that elements within the Syrian and Lebanese
military-security apparatus independently ordered and arranged it.”193 Lesch uses as
evidence to support his assertion that “throughout the fall of 2004 and into early 2005,
Bashar became more cooperative with the United States, clearly signaled his readiness to
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reenter peace negotiations with Israel, and stepped up efforts to prevent insurgents from
entering Iraq.” Bashar had apparently handed the ‘Lebanon file’ over to Walid Mouallim
in January of 2005, a Syrian viewed as a moderate and a positive move towards SyrianLebanese relations.194 The implication is that Mouallim was handed ‘official’ policy in
Lebanon just before the assassination, making it unlikely that the assassination had
official sanction given his views.
Prior to the assassination, Syria had been the target of UN resolution 1559, which
sought the removal of Syrian forces from Lebanon. Syria had also been targeted by the
United States' Syrian Accountability and Lebanese Restoration Act, an attempt at
containing Syria's economic interests as well as being a sharp denunciation of its policies.
As a direct result, Bashar ended up being more conciliatory regarding Iraq. As a result of
the assassination, Bashar ended up being conciliatory regarding the withdrawal of troops
in Lebanon. It would not be difficult to come to the conclusion that Bashar can be moved
easily by external assertions of power. However, certain evidence should be weighed and
tested for a different conclusion. Bashar had already begun withdrawing troops on a
number of occasions before the final pull-out. 195 It is likely that the moves by outside
powers simply ushered in a faster withdrawal. Keeping Syrian troops within Lebanon
was not viewed as particularly vital to Syria. If this is true, then it is likely that, rather
than being a regime known for its ‘spoiler’ modus operandi, Bashar actually seeks to
push towards a more stable equilibrium as it relates to international norms and his own
domestic constituency, all with an eye towards pursuing goals on a gradualist time-table.
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This may be understood in terms of value maximization. The leader of Syria is interested
in making the best choice for his country, which may be viewed from a dispassionate
perspective. The previous equilibrium idea can be illustrated by a further discussion of
the regional Lebanon-Syria-Israel triangle.
The question then, of why these interests and choices rank so high in Syria’s
payoff function is of crucial importance. Syria views the Israelis as naturally, and by
virtue of historical factors, having the upper hand in the region. Consequently, Perthes'
vision of Syrian motivation adds weight to the international and domestic norm
equilibrium argument: “Lebanon, in particular, must preserve its pro-Syrian stability, lest
it fall under Israeli influence. Generally, Syria's approach to Arab-Israeli issues is driven
by a zero-sum logic which holds that Israeli gains in terms of security, economic
resources or political relations constitute a relative loss for the Arab side.”196 This is a
solid example of the type of value that Syria places on Lebanon, and why Bashar, from
the RAM perspective, chooses to place Lebanon and intransigence against Israel at such a
high level of value. Syrian motives have been referred to as that of spoiler. The regime
has been classed with those being rogue. Bashar himself has been referred to as 'the evileye doctor.'197 In reality, Perthes’ argument illuminates Bashar's understanding of the
realities of his situation: that Bashar needs aid from other Arab countries who view Syria
as the front line to Israeli resistance; that his own constituency is primarily made up of
powerful 'invisible' or 'old guard' elements who seek to maintain the
Allawi/Ba'ath/merchant-military complex; that a popular mandate exists through a
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nationalistic creed. All of these views highlight the pragmatic heirloom in Hafiz’s
personality that was passed onto his son. All of these views further point to a picture of
Bashar as rational actor.
Bashar’s choices also extend into the economic field. Lebanon and Syria are tied
together by several thick strands, some of which elaborate on the pragmatic association of
Syria with its sister country. Christopher Hemmer writes, “Lebanon remains
economically vital to the Asad regime. Its relatively freer economic climate offers an
outlet for the Syrian business class, it provides an important source of income for the
military commanders stationed in Lebanon, and thousands of Syrians travel to Lebanon
to find work.”198 Smuggling in the case of the military officers, liberal Lebanese banks
and financial institutions for Syria's business elite, and the labor industry for over half a
million Syrian laborers as of 2001.199 This number was estimated to be around a million
between 2003 and 2005, when growing violence against Syrian laborers began to pick up
after the Hariri Assassination, due to an increase in the level of anxiety about Syrian
encroachment. About 15% of Syria's labor force is working in Lebanon, mostly as
construction workers.200 This economic tie limits the suggestion that Lebanon is only an
arena for a proxy battle with Israel. Israel undoubtedly knows what Lebanon is to Syria
economically, and the Syrian elite can certainly fathom the economic difficulties of a
world in which Lebanon has moved away from Syria towards Israel. This is not to say
that Lebanon ever will move away from Syria, or even has the capability. It suggests that
it is a fear held by the Syrian old guard, perhaps seemingly misplaced. However, the
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region without a paranoid Syrian elite could eventually change the face of the region.
This suggests, again, value maximization.
The Syrian economy has been hurting for some time. Bashar's father attempted to
liberalize certain aspects of the economy by making the climate for foreign investment
more advantageous. Bashar has continued some amount of liberalization by unifying the
exchange rate, bringing the information age to Syria through the use of the internet and
new laws to allow private banks.201 The State Planning Commission announced in 2004
that Syria will take on the foundations of a market economy by 2010, though at the Ba'ath
Regional Conference the words were slightly different: social market economy.202
However, Bashar's major motivation has been job creation. With 45% of Syria's
population being under age 15, the labor force growing at twice the speed of job creation,
and many jobs being in the inefficient public sector, there is a distinct need for job
creation policies.203
The global financial crisis has not affected Syria to a strong degree. However,
Syrian growth is still expected to slow from around 5% in 2008 to around 2% in 2009
due to “the global and regional economic slowdown” due to “reducing workers'
remittances, tourism, FDI and exports.”204 Syria will also post a 3% current account
deficit of GDP after a small surplus, and a fiscal deficit which is set to decline to 5.5% of
GDP. Inflation is also set to fall to 8.5%, down from 15.6% in 2008.205 The above
accumulated does not represent a rosy picture for the Syrian economy, but it is far from
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dire.
More recently, Bashar has shifted tactics. Perthes writes, “The need to put Syria's
foreign relations to the service of economic recovery and modernization has meant
cultivating relations with the EU and its member states, and making the best use of
regional opportunities for trade and cooperation.”206 He has begun creating closer
relations with Turkey, where a joint bank is being considered, with Jordan, where the
Joint Jordanian-Syrian Higher Committee may sign agreements for grain exports,
industrial cooperation and technical cooperation on energy and power, and with the EU,
where the Syrian-EU Association Agreement is being hammered out. Saudi Arabia's king
Abdullah recently visited Syria in a move that signals warming relations between the two
countries. Qatar helped to quiet anger at Syria over Lebanon at the Doha Agreement in
2008.207 This all comes on the heels of beneficial trade with Iraq prior to the 2003
invasion, which Bashar also pushed. However, since some members associated with the
Syrian government were implicated in a string of bombings in Iraq during 2009, and
since the difficulties with the Iraqi-Syrian border, relations have cooled.
These decisions to engage a number of countries reflect consistent value
maximizing choice, which changed from father to son. Relations with a number of these
countries were previously stormy, but the indications point towards a desire to see more
trade in the region between Syria and its neighbors, given that most non-oil related
exports and imports are with other Arab countries. This marks a shift in the relations
between countries as they existed under Hafiz. For example, Hafiz and Jordan's King
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Hussein often clashed over political issues, which caused an economic rift. However,
Bashar, and Hussein's successor Abdullah, are now working on such joint projects as
electricity grids, dam projects and even water delivery.208 When Syria and Turkey almost
went to war in 1998 over Syrian support for Kurdish insurgents, relations between the
countries were at an all time low. However, after the Adana agreement, relations
improved under Hafiz and then under Bashar, despite Turkey's military cooperation with
Israel.209 Recently, though the regime denies any politicization behind the move, Turkey
postponed a military exercise with Israel.210 Syria, on the other hand, held joint military
exercises with Turkey in April of 2009, and according to Defense Minister Ali Habbib,
plans to hold 'more comprehensive' ones at a later date.211
Iran is a special case for Syria. Having signed a mutual defense pact in 2004
(largely wished for by the Syrians after the 2003 Iraq invasion), they then signed a
Memorandum of Understanding in 2006 which called for mutual defense against threats
emanating from the US and Israel.212 The two were brought close based on a number of
factors; a shi'a leadership, a falling out between Syria and Iranian rival Iraq over Ba’athist
ideology, support for Iran during the Iran-Iraq war, and proxy use of Hizbullah within
Lebanon. The major problem with getting closer to Iran, as Bashar has come to find out,
is the fifth principle in bargaining, namely that it is possible for country A to affect the
domestic politics of country B. Iran’s tacit alliance with Syria, recently made more
concrete, is a powerful example of a two-level game. Iran and Syria both have levels of
208
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control over Hizbullah, and Hizbullah has an effect upon Israel. Iran’s use of Hizbullah
means they have a bargaining chip in domestic politics which can force Syria to play ball
in both its domestic choices for policy and reform, and its foreign policy choices related
to Lebanon.
There have been times, however, where Syria's relationship with its Arab
benefactors, like Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, meant it has opposed some Iranian policies.
Emile el-Hokayem writes that “They have diverging interests when things are good in the
region...but when things deteriorate, they have obvious reasons to come together.”213
The consistent ability to be able to understand Bashar in terms of his desire to
maximize value in his preferences, in addition to the choices made regarding balance of
power in the region, all point to a rational perspective. Of course Bashar must be
understood from the perspective of a bounded rational utility whereby we cannot be
certain that he sees choice from this perspective. It is difficult enough to decide in an
analysis using RAM methods whether or not he is right. The analysis above seems clear
enough to assert that a Rational Actor Model can help to explain choices, and thus was
frequently used by many of the writers above to analyze Syria’s choices.
Attempting to understand Syrian interest, however, without taking into account
the mindset of Bashar Al-Assad, is counterproductive – particularly because of bounded
rationality. Christopher Phillips writes, “Bashar al-Asad repeatedly has spoken of his
desire to form a bridge between the Islamic Republic and the West whether peace with
Israel is secured or not. In short, the Iran connection gives Syria a regional role, allowing
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it to play the moderate younger brother to temper Tehran’s tantrums.”214 Phillips critique
asserts that Syria does not have a client-state relationship with Iran, because Syria is not
dependent upon Iran in either the political, military or economic sphere. They may not be
dependent upon Iran in those regards, but Bashar is dependent upon the old guard, who
consider it within their interest to maintain ties to Iran. These ties, difficult to see, can
nonetheless cause the Syrian President to move in ways that may be against a ‘Syrian
national interest.’
In terms of Rational Actor Model, it is difficult to fully come to grips with how
Syria has changed since the time of Hafiz. Situational factors have changed, making the
balance different and the choices associated with that balance different. Further, value
preferences have changed as a result of a new power structure and new international
norm requirements like the war on terror.

Conclusion
An in-depth analysis of Bashar Al-Assad must take into account all three methods
described by Allison and Zelikow. This does not mean that all of their methods can be
used, as indeed, group discussion has been minimal at best in the preceding chapter.
However, with the use of the theories in chapter I as a primer, Chapter II has had a
number of solid methodologies from which to set its base.
Using Rational Actor Model, we were able to see Bashar much as his father had
been described by writers before him; as a rational leader who can be dissected using
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concepts like value maximization and balancing. Without really understanding Bashar’s
mind, the model was helpful in determining, through the situational perspective, the
extent to which Bashar will make specific strategic decisions and his ability to calculate
from a ‘rational’ perspective.
Model II was helpful in understanding the institutions at work in Syrian society.
From a Model II perspective, it was essential to understand the history and progress of
state institutions like the Ba’ath, Military and the Allawi. These three longstanding
institutions in Syrian society have cultural, bureaucratic and political connotations which
cannot be ignored. However, rather than use this piece as a stand-alone, it was very
helpful to take the institutional qualities of Syria and match them up against the
bargaining aspects of Model III.
Model III bargaining sets the scene by which the actors in Syria penetrate the
decision making process. As described initially by a discussion of older decision-making
theories like those of Snyder and Brecher, it is apparent that decision-making causes
action, which in turn causes reaction at different levels of Syrian society. It has become
possible to see which actions cause reaction within the state, by players within the
invisible layer, and even some which cause reaction outside of the state, such as in the
regional battle with Israel.
However, in order to understand to a more intricate degree how Bashar may be
influenced, what sorts of initiatives he will propose, and how he will act as Syria’s
president, a more in-depth analysis of quantifiable speech analysis is essential. This
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speech analysis will help to create a psychological profile whereby preference ordering
and value maximization are understood in the context of Syria’s leader.
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Chapter III

Quantitative Designs in Psychological Profiling
The main quantitative form for the analysis of individual leaders comes through
speech evaluation. Speech evaluation is the closest method in at-a-distance analysis to
being able to place a leader 'on the couch,' so to speak. These quantitative methods have
the ability to take the written or spoken word, break it down into component parts, set it
up against a control group, and come up with a method whose results are repeatable.
This section will describe three different methods of quantitative analysis for use, two of
which it will be possible to use on Bashar Al-Assad. Specifically, we will identify the
methods of integrative complexity scoring, trait coding from text, and a process known as
operational code analysis.
The collection of speech writing samples is not as simple as it first seems. The
selectivity of speeches is important and each method has roughly similar patterns. Walter
Weintraub writes that “To obtain spontaneous speech samples, transcribed news
conferences and personal interviews are used. Their use is based upon the assumption
that the stress generated by such encounters is roughly comparable to what subjects
experience when speaking without interruption for ten minutes.”215 This is done to
simulate the process that is required for spontaneity to be established, which calls upon
the subject's use of set cognitive patterns and held beliefs. On the other hand, there has
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been a study which shows that prepared statements, even those prepared by a speech
writer, are roughly analogous to spontaneous remarks, at least in the field of integrative
complexity. This finding, however, remains “tentative.”216 As a result, each of these
quantitative designs will follow as closely as possible the original intention of each
method. Where some comparative value is lost, an attempt will nonetheless be made to
bridge the outcomes into a cohesive analysis of leadership potential.

Integrative Complexity217
Understanding the level of complexity is a key point in quantitative text analysis
and is divided into two parts: integrative and conceptual complexity. Integrative
complexity is the “concern with structure as opposed to content, structure referring to the
conceptual rules (i.e., differentiation and integration) utilized in thinking, deciding, and
interrelating.”218 Differentiation and integration are situation specific and, put simply,
refer to the degree to which the subject takes into account alternatives to his or her own
views (differentiation) and whether or not there is a link between those views
(integration). The method for grading integrative complexity requires an expert coder
trained in an objective (with some elements of subjective) style of structural analysis.
Integrative complexity is “focused on the internal and external factors that govern
the level of complexity at which a person is functioning at a specific time and in a
specific situation.”219 This highlights the importance of context yet again since implicit
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here is that complexity for an individual can and will change based on the environment
and situation. Integrative complexity, also known as state complexity, will have a
number of different factors including intrapsychic factors and situational characteristics
which include the task environment and social factors.220 The intrapsychic factor has a
connective component between state and trait (integrative and conceptual) complexities,
where much research has been done on the level of perceived conflict and its ability to
increase or decrease motivation.
The task environment, as a situational characteristic, derives its relevance from
the myriad stimuli affecting an individual while in pursuit of a task. This could include
physical factors like fatigue, mental factors such as uncertainty, or group factors with
regard to conflict amongst players.221 In these cases, high complexity is associated with a
negotiated settlement, and low complexity is associated with war. This has obvious
ramifications; if a leader's speeches are increasingly less complex, the nation could be
gearing for a major conflict. An increase in complexity could mean the end of a conflict
or the beginning of negotiated settlement.
The first social factor is impression management. This is a key factor in
determining the actual importance of the subject's focus. If one assumption of the
intrapsychic process is that leaders think and believe as they write and speak, then
impression management attempts to understand how “an issue may be discussed not at
the level of complexity at which the source actually thinks about it but rather at the level
that the source believes will create the desired impression on the target audience.”222 The
220
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authors maintain that this factor is difficult to isolate from the intrapsychic factor, since
testing for impression management is not possible. They see some hope in the possibility
that private records can be analyzed next to public ones, but there is an obvious
requirement for private data issue here.
The second social factor is source position and status. Basically, this factor
asserts that those not in power, i.e. in the opposition, attack a position using less complex
statements than those defending or proposing a position who are in power.223 The need of
the underdog may have something to do with rhetorical weight or an interest in wooing
the populace through catchy and un-complex slogans, or perhaps it is the requirement of
those in power to more carefully consider the position and argument. It is often easier to
criticize original work than come up with original work oneself.
Other social factors include individual differences within groups (discussed
within the group section), the effects of groupthink (discussed in the biases section), and
the perception of the audience. One example of the perception dynamic is the higher
level of complexity for the subject when the audience is known to agree.224

Trait Analysis
The other side to integrative complexity is conceptual complexity, or trait
analysis. “Conceptual complexity theory traces consistent levels of complexity that
characterize a given individual's functioning....”225 According to these authors, the
difference between the previous model and this one is that trait theory is relatively
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stagnant, more prevalent amongst leadership analysts, and is similar with regards to its
structural emphasis. This second model, which will be used in the analysis, is a
conceptual complexity model, emphasizing trait analysis developed by Margaret G.
Hermann. Not only has she written prolifically on theory, but she has also done a great
deal of work putting the theory to practical usage through her prolific writing on actual
leaders. In addition, she has developed models for comparative studies and developed
programs like Profiler+, which will be used later on Bashar Al-Assad.226
Like many other quantitative analysts, Hermann likes to use spontaneous material,
preferring interviews without pre-known questions. She does, however, find it
worthwhile to do analyses of spontaneous versus more rehearsed material, in an effort to
“[gain] some insight between a leader's public and private self.”227
Hermann assesses leaders through a complex system of leadership style variables
and motivation variables. This term “means the ways in which leaders relate to those
around them – whether constituents, advisers, or other leaders – and how they structure
interactions and the norms, rules, and principles they use to guide such interactions.”228
She uses seven traits to analyze leadership style – belief in the ability to control events,
need for power and influence, conceptual complexity, self-confidence, an internal versus
external focus, general distrust of others, and the amount of in-group bias.229 These traits
further clarify the responsiveness to constraints and the ability to take in new information,
along with how leaders are motivated to interact with the political realm. In order to find
a politician's motivation, be it either from a problem focus or a relationship focus,
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Hermann uses a task focus criterion. The attempt is to identify the motivation of the
leader for the group. The motivation towards the world, which consists of in-group bias
and distrust of others, focuses on whether or not leaders identify threats or opportunities,
and their desire to build relationships.230
Hermann's methodology allows her to place individuals into typological
categories. Using the factors that make up leadership style, she identifies how motivation
is reflected in the different responses to constraint, and the ability to take in information.
For example, if a leader challenges his or her constraints, is open to information, and is
motivated from an external relationship-driven focus, then their typological leadership
style will be classified as Directive, a style placing a strong emphasis on status control
and reputational need.231 There are eight typologies, each of which can be used to
classify a type of leader. The crusader challenges constraints, is closed to information,
and can be either Expansionistic (problem) or Evangelistic (relationship). The strategist
challenges constraints as well, but is open to information and can be either Actively
Independent (problem) or Directive (relationship). The pragmatic respects constraints
and is closed to information, and can be either Incremental (problem) or Influential
(relationship). The opportunist also respects constraints, but is open to information and
can be either reactively Opportunistic (problem) or Collegial (relationship).232 Profiler+
will be used to assess the traits of Bashar Al-Assad. The data will then be run up against
a comparison group, constructing a profile, and contextualizing the profile based on
Hermann's rules for the nature of topics and audience, and the focus of attention.233
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Operational Coding234
“…the leader’s beliefs about the nature and source of conflict in the political
universe [are] the basis for other philosophical beliefs about the prospects for realizing
fundamental goals, the predictability of the political future, the leader’s control over
historical development, and the role of chance.”235 Ole R. Holsti in 1977 developed
operational coding in order to find answers about a leader’s philosophical beliefs which
will “…influence the instrumental beliefs of the leader regarding the most effective
strategy and tactics, the optimum approach to the calculation and management of risks,
and the utility and timing of employing different means to protect or achieve political
objectives.”236
This is a particularly important objective method for analyzing a leader like
Bashar Al-Assad due to its self/other methodology. Essentially, “it defines politics as the
exercise of power between actors, in which the beliefs of each actor about the nature of
the political universe and the most effective strategies and tactics in this universe
influence the choices of means, tactics, and strategies and the ensuing outcomes of
interaction episodes between them.”237 This means that in a country where it is so
difficult to analyze the ‘invisible layer,’ we can instead use operational coding to view
Bashar’s perspective on this gray layer of Syrian society.
The texts for operational coding may be statements made in speeches or
interviews. The purpose of operational coding is to identify the instrumental and
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philosophical beliefs that a leader has in order to nail down the particular way in which
he views the world. For example, this method will use Holsti’s typologies described
below to define how Bashar views the nature of the universe.
Holsti’s six typologies help to place the subject in context. For example, Type A
leaders believe that conflict is temporary and caused by misunderstanding. This in turn
causes conflict to escalate. The future can be foreseen, and control over it is possible.
This type likes cooperating. Type B also believes conflict is temporary, is more
methodical in the handling of issues, and believes that rivals can be made to stop by
using different strategies. Type C is the last to believe in temporary conflict. This type
believes that the overarching system of states can be formulated to promote the interests
of all. However, until the system is changed, there exists a negative attitude towards the
possibility of harmony. The last three types all believe that conflict is permanent. Type
D believes it is caused by human nature, type E by nationalism, and type F by
international anarchy. The future is unknowable, and control fleeting at best. This type
doesn’t like war, if only because it changes the dynamics of power.238
In addition, there are subtypes. These take the form of move, counter, and
counter-counter. They are represented as escalation and de-escalation.239 For example,
type EDE would look as follows: the self escalates, followed by de-escalation by the
other. The self then responds to the de-escalation with further escalation. We can use
these subtypes to determine how a leader will react to rivals.
Important questions will follow, such as the degree of control the leader has, his
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views of his own ability to change things, and the views of others. It will also define how
he views certain types of speech strategies. For instance, does he prefer using reward
statements or appeal statements? How about statements of punishment or statements of
threat? Bashar will be classified by using a set of standardized statements identified with
particular scores as defined by the authors of the method.

Trait Analysis of Bashar Al-Assad
Understanding Bashar Al-Assad through his life and world is fundamentally
different than taking an in-depth look at the words he uses through the quantitative and
objective data that computer programs can give us. Weintraub goes over three
assumptions when using grammar to identify components of a leader’s personality. “(1)
patterns of thinking and behaving are reflected in styles of speaking; (2) under stress, a
speaker’s choice of grammatical structures will mirror characteristic coping mechanisms;
and (3) personality traits are revealed by grammatical structures having a slow rate of
change.”240
Using Hermann’s method of trait analysis and her corresponding device for its
exploration, Profiler Plus, the previous, more subjective study can be augmented by
objective criteria to explore Bashar’s personality, reasoning and, more importantly, the
way he will think in future situations.241 Data analysis will allow the reader to get over
the common mirror imaging bias prevalent in analysis, which asserts that the analyst will
often place his or her own personality and reasoning onto the reasoning of a foreign
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subject.
To reiterate quickly what was said before, an analysis of Bashar’s personality in
the realm of the following seven traits will be attempted:

(1) the belief that one can influence or control what happens, (2) the need for power and influence,
(3) conceptual complexity (the ability to differentiate things and people in one’s environment), (4)
self-confidence, (5) the tendency to focus on problem solving and accomplishing something
versus maintenance of the group and dealing with others’ ideas and sensitivities, (6) general
distrust or suspiciousness of others, and (7) the intensity with which a person holds an in-group
bias.242

These seven traits will be used to answer three questions: How leaders respond to the
obstacles or chains that hold them back, how their mind uses information to assess issues,
and what motivation causes them to pursue a given end.
This researcher took over 80 different statements from six interviews spanning
Bashar’s decade long tenure. The statements include different foreign topics including
Palestine, Iraq, Lebanon, Iran, Israel, the US SALSA agreement, and the Golan Heights.
Domestic topics like democracy, internal reform, civil society, freedom of expression,
economic reform and corruption were also used. These statements came from interviews
with Al-Bab in 2001, Al-Hayat in 2003, Christian Amanpour in 2005, Democracy Now in
2006, Mother Jones in 2007 and Alix Van Buren in 2009.
Ironically, even though Bashar Al-Assad is a Middle Eastern leader, more of his
personality scores are closer to President Bill Clinton (close scores on conceptual
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complexity, task focus, distrust of others and in-group bias) than to Saddam Hussein
(close scores on task focus and the belief one can control events).243 What this tells us is
that two Middle Eastern dictators are not necessarily closer in personality than a
democratically elected president in a free country and a young dictator/president in a
closed country. It tells us that not all men or women in charge of repressive countries are
alike. It explains that if there are two closed countries, and both have different heads of
state from a psychological context, then there must be other factors involved. However,
these simple assertions tell us very little. What will tell us more is how the traits interact
to give us answers to the three main questions described two paragraphs above.
The first two traits are the belief in one’s ability to control events and the need for
power. Bashar scored moderately (slightly lower) on the former and low on the latter
when compared to the 87 heads of state. Hermann tells us that those who score high on
the belief that they can control events are “generally more interested and active in the
policy-making process” while those who score low “tend to be more reactive to
situations, waiting to see how the situation is likely to play out before acting.”244 Scoring
low in the need for power, however, indicates that a leader is comfortable delegating
authority to others, indicating a level of trust and a desire to see the group benefit over the
individual. This group may be defined as broadly as the Allawi/Ba’ath/Military or as
narrowly as Bashar’s personal advisors. This naturally causes the group to have a higher
level of morale and sense of accountability with regards to actions which they
collectively take.
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Table 1

Bashar Al-Assad’s Scores on Seven Traits

Personality
Trait

Bashar
AlAssad

Bill Clinton vs.
Saddam
Hussein

Middle
East
Leaders

87
Heads of
State

Belief Can
Control
Events

.41

.47 / .49

M =.44
L < .31
H > .57

M =.44
L < .30
H > .58

Need for
Power

.29

.52 / .57

SelfConfidence

.42

.72 / .83

Conceptual
Complexity

.64

.62 / .49

Task
Focus

.63

.61 / .56

In-group
Bias or
Nationalism
Distrust of
Others

.12

.32 / .66

.18

.27 / .53

M =.54
L < .42
H > .64
M =.71
L < .52
H > .88
M =.49
L < .48
H > .50
M =.54
L < .49
H > .59
M =.49
L < .47
H > .50
M =.44
L < .43
H > .45

M =.50
L < .37
H > .62
M =.62
L < .44
H < .81
M =.44
L < .32
H > .56
M =.59
L < .46
H > .71
M =.42
L < .32
H > .53
M =.41
L < .25
H > .56

M = Mean, L = Low, H = High245

This is someone who straddles the line between respecting constraints and
challenging constraints. When Bashar respects constraints, he will try to affect policy
decisions within the structure of the constraints, while utilizing compromise and
consensus building. When he challenges constraints, he is not as successful because he
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does not understand as well what it means to influence people within a negotiating or
bargaining framework. In Bashar’s case specifically, the “invisible layer” is likely so
powerful a component that Bashar is naturally pushed towards the respect aspect because
of a lack of success in his challenges. The Damascus winter comes to mind, a period
reflecting the time shortly after Bashar’s initial attempt at reform which ended in a
repression, or winter. Further, the challenges and constraints he must consistently face
cause a type of group utilization format to be a desirable choice, regardless of whether or
not it is his ‘natural’ inclination. This at least points towards an indication of how to deal
with the regime, be it at the state or otherwise.
The self-confidence trait is determined, verbally, by pronouns, but more generally
by the question of just how important the leader views himself in relation to the context.
Conceptual complexity refers to an individual’s ability to see the gray area, so to speak,
and the ability to react with this information in mind. Scores for self-confidence and
conceptual complexity will determine how the leader processes and responds to
information. Hermann writes that “Ziller and his colleagues (1977) observed that these
two traits interrelate to form a leader’s self-other orientation. The self-other orientation
indicates how open the leader will be to input from others in the decision-making process
and from the political environment.”246 Since Bashar’s conceptual complexity is higher
than his self-confidence, his orientation towards the other is strong and domineering.247
As a result, he can see the needs and requirements of others and work towards them while
keeping an open mind, with the understanding that the path being followed is beneficial.
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Leaders like this see a ‘wider array of stimuli from their environment’ and “remain highly
attuned to contextual information since they do not necessarily trust their initial response
to an event.”248 As a result, these leaders may occasionally be viewed as ‘fence sitters’
due to the fact that they decide slower than others. This is often due to a desire for
increasing amounts of information from differentiated sources. Because Bashar seems
genuinely interested in what others have to say, they flock to him. It is for this reason that
the cult of personality which formed around his father Hafiz was able to transpose itself
so well onto Bashar. Tales abound regarding Bashar’s generosity and his ability to listen
and respond to individuals at the common level. The shift in the cult of personality from
father to son, and Bashar’s own personal traits, may be the proximate cause of Bashar
holding power as a ‘charismatic dictator’ with the requisite legitimacy.
Leaders are motivated, in general, in one of two ways: either they have an internal
focus, such as a problem, or a need for a wanted response from others; be it acceptance,
power, support or acclaim. As a result, Hermann writes, “we are interested in both why
the leader sought office and their need to preserve and secure the group they are leading
(and, in turn, their position).”249 Pulling together three traits will give us the answer
sought: task focus, in-group bias and distrust of others. The first, task focus, will show
why the leader sought office, be it for problem (self) or relation (other) focus. Bashar’s
scores for Task focus are interesting in that they are moderate when compared to the 87
heads of state, suggesting both a relationship (external) and problem focus (internal), but
high when compared to other leaders in the Middle East, suggesting a problem (internal)
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focus.
Hermann writes that the moderate scoring leader will often be a charismatic, and
this certainly allies itself to the notion of the charismatic dictator, to which many Middle
Eastern nations ascribe (think Col. Ghaddafi in Libya, King Abdullah of Jordan, Ayatollah
Khomeini of Iran and, of course, Bashar’s own father). This duality can be explained by
what a moderate relationship means when compared to the rest of the world, and what a
high relationship means when compared to the Middle East. Bashar emphasizes the
problem greater than the Middle Eastern group, identifying what he feels to be major
issues and then working towards a solution. In being moderate with regards to other
world leaders, Bashar has identified that he has to be like other Middle Eastern leaders in
attempting to maintain relationships as best as possible. “They can concentrate on solving
problems when called for by the situation, but they can also switch to an interest in others’
ideas and feelings when the context in which they find themselves changes.”250
The final two traits, in-group bias and the distrust for others, are important ones in
determining the President’s outlook on the world. In-group bias has the ability to be very
important to Bashar because it refers to the level that a leader is biased towards his or her
group, however defined. Earlier we discussed the ideas that the Ba’ath, Allawi and
military groups were very important in the development of modern Syria. Bashar’s low
score on in-group bias does not necessarily disprove the notion that he is occasionally
influenced by the old guard, but does indicate that he does not want them to have a
prominent position. This score is indicative of the actions he will take. The groups’
mentioned are important to his development and his ability to make decisions, and it may
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also be important that he accommodate them to some regard. Bashar is motivated by
something else besides a desperate, fearful need to keep the Ba’ath, Allawi and/or
Military in power. This is certainly drawn out by the facts with regards to the weakening
of the Ba’ath regional power structure. Bashar likely has no illusions about the Allawi
always being a prominent fixture in Syrian politics. While he may attempt to maintain
their position in order to further his own influence, this is a means, not an ends. The same
is likely true of Bashar’s conception of the military. This does not mean, however, that
other elements within the regime, the invisible layer or old guard, are not or will not
hesitate to use harmful strategies in the pursuit of group maintenance, just that Bashar is
less likely to do so.
The final trait, distrust of others, is a telling one about how Bashar chooses to
perceive the motivations of others. He has certainly done a number of high profile
interviews, suggesting a need to improve the image of Syria, or at least not to hide it.
Bashar’s low score on this trait does not mean he is open and trusting, but rather that he
“tend[s] to put it into perspective. Trust and distrust are more likely to be based on past
experience with the people involved and on the nature of the current situation.”251 Bashar
certainly has had his share of cabinet reshuffles, which can be viewed as distrust in the
status quo. However, this appears to be more of a long-term strategy of weeding out the
old guard, coupled with the difficult task of maintaining his relationship with them. It is
possible Bashar believes the old guard can be trusted, if only to maintain the status quo.
The in-group bias and distrust of others traits will combine to help us show the
motivation of the leader towards the world; i.e. whether they perceive the world as
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threatening or not, and how they will deal with the world based on this viewpoint. Bashar
scores very low on both traits, and as a result, he falls into Hermann’s ‘opportunities and
relationships’ category. He does not view the world as particularly threatening, and
instead tries to work within the boundaries of his position by taking advantage of those
‘opportunities and relationships’ which can be useful given the task required.252
Cooperation, at least with those in the Syrian power structure, is thus seen as part and
parcel to his motivational ethos. Paranoia about the threat level of others would directly
contradict the cooperation required for his problem focus. There are however, varying
levels of cooperation, and some types of cooperation must be eschewed in order to garner
other types of cooperation. That the cooperative desire is more powerful than the view of
other actors as threatening is probable. One need only look as far as his newfound desire
to cooperate with the European Union, Turkey, Jordan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, etc. However,
his need to cooperate internally may leave him little room, even if desired, to cooperate
with Israel.
Bashar’s scores for these last two are low, which makes him similar in some
respects to President Bill Clinton. Hermann writes that “Clinton views the political
process as a large game board, where all players must sacrifice some things so that they
can advance toward the general goal…. Compared to leaders with an adversarial or zerosum view of politics, where there should always be a clear winner and loser, such tactics
make Clinton seem as if he has no principles or, at the least, is wishy-washy and weak.”253
This last phrase has been used on a number of occasions to describe Bashar, given his
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political acumen and situation. However, like Clinton, Bashar seems to view politics as a
push-and-pull game where he is constantly testing to see which of his policies he can
implement and to what extent based on an accurate reading of Syria’s domestic
constituencies and the world’s foreign ones.
The final verdict using Hermann’s method of trait analysis is helpful, but just like
the high conceptual complexity score of the subject, somewhat gray. The analysis should
help us fit Bashar into one of the eight categories described by Hermann in her attempt to
classify leaders based on the three questions. However, we immediately run into
problems because of Bashar’s scores on responsiveness to constraints. He seems to both
respect and challenge constraints, which is certainly in keeping with the more subjective
analysis above and in the historical record. We can, however, narrow down the
possibilities when realizing that Bashar’s scores for openness to information is most
certainly open based on the fact that his conceptual complexity is far higher than his selfconfidence. This leaves the question of motivation. If Bashar has a problem focus, which
he certainly seems to have against other Middle Eastern leaders, then we may classify him
as an Active Independent if he challenges constraints and as Opportunistic if he respects
constraints. Our problem is that he also has a relationship focus because of his moderate
score on task focus versus the 87 heads of state. This would entitle him to be both in the
Directive category if he challenges constraints and in the Collegial category when he
respects them.
Bashar’s father, ironically, was also among these types. Hafiz Al-Assad would
have been grouped into the Active Independent style, based on his high belief in his own
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ability to control events and in the need for power, suggesting a constraint challenger.
Like Bashar, Hafiz had a conceptual complexity that was higher than his self-confidence,
giving him an open mind to new information. Further, Hafiz was problem focused.
Finally, though he had a high in-group bias, he didn’t distrust people. Hermann’s analysis
continues:

He will be highly interested in maintaining his own and Syria’s maneuverability and
independence in a world that he perceives continually tries to limit both. Although Assad
perceives that the world is conflict prone, he also views all countries as being somewhat
constrained by international norms, affording him some flexibility in what he can do.
However, he must vigilantly monitor developments in the international arena and prudently
prepare to contain an adversary while still pursuing Syria’s interests.254

Bashar, however, has his own unique mind. While he may take some maneuvers
from his father’s playbook, the truth is that he is not high in the need for power or ingroup bias, nor is he just problem focused. Based on these differences, it would be
prudent to say that while Bashar is interested in maintaining government, it does not
necessarily need to be in the same form. He is likely to focus on what may be possible in
the situation and context, suggesting the Opportunistic bent while also attempting to
build consensus amongst disparate power bases, suggesting a Collegial manner. These
types assume that Bashar respects constraints, which he likely does for most domestic
(Invisible layer/Old Guard) and foreign (Iran, International arena with power oriented
towards Israel) difficulties.
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Operational Coding of Bashar Al-Assad

Table 2.1
I1
.24

Bashar’s Instrumental Belief Scores
I2
.07

Table 2.2
Punish
.13

I3
.20

P1
.35

Oppose
.25

P3
.11

Threaten
.02

Table 4.1

Bashar’s Self Scores

+2
1

Table 4.2
+3
62

+2
9

Promise
.01

Reward
.12

P4a
.22

P4b
.78

P5
.97

Promise
.04

Reward
.25

Bashar’s Philosophical Belief Scores

Punish
.16

+3
8

Appeal
.48

Bashar’s Philosophical Belief Scores
P2
.19

Table 3.2

I4b
.50

Bashar’s Instrumental Belief Scores (I5)
Threaten
0

Table 3.1

I4a
.76

+1
33

-1
17

Oppose
.14

-2
0

Appeal
.38

-3
9

Bashar’s Other Scores
+1
93

-1
35

-2
5

-3
39

Using the tables, we use the Verbs in Context System (VICS) indices to process
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the information. The first of Bashar’s scores lead to the balance indices for the nature of
the political universe and strategic direction, which is taken from the P1 score for the
former in Table 3.1 and from the I1 score for the latter in Table 2.1. While using these
indices, a specific standardized format will be used per Walker, Schafer and Young’s
directions. Bashar believes that the political universe is somewhat friendly and he also
believes that a somewhat cooperation-oriented direction is the best strategy in this
universe. There should be emphasis in the above statement placed on ‘somewhat.’
Central tendency indices determine the leader’s beliefs about the prospects for
realizing political values (P2) and the belief about the intensity of tactics (I2). As a
result, Bashar believes that the prospects for realizing fundamental political goals are
somewhat optimistic, and he also believes that mixed cooperative tactics are best under
this condition. By mixed, it is meant that Bashar will choose an intensity somewhere
between conflictual and cooperative.
Proportion indices show the leader’s belief in his or her control over historical
development (P4a) vs. others’ control (P4b) and the relative utility of different ways of
exercising political power (I5). Bashar believes that he has a low degree of control over
historical development while also attributing a high level of control to others in the
political universe. This may be true for both domestic and foreign matters. Further, we
will make inferences from the descriptors associated with the utility of means: Bashar
believes that the comparative utility of appeal/support statements is very high, the
comparative utility of opposition/resistance is high, the comparative utility of
punishments and rewards is medium to low, and the comparative utility of promises and
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threats is very low.
The dispersion indices, of which there are four, take into account the exercise of
political power. The first are predictability of the political future and risk orientation.
These take into account predictability for both self (P3) and others (I3). Bashar’s beliefs
have scores of .11 for P3 and .20 for I3 attributes very low predictability to himself and
low predictability to others. The next part of the dispersion indices take into account
“timing: flexibility in shifting between different kinds of tactics as a risk management
technique.”255 Bashar’s beliefs with scores of .76 (I4a) and .50 (I4b) for shifts between
cooperation/conflict and words/deeds, respectively, manage the very low predictability of
the political future by attributing a risk orientation of high flexibility in
cooperation/conflict and medium flexibility in words/deeds to himself. This gives further
credence to his scores in the trait analysis section which suggested the ability to shift
from cooperation to conflict. Lastly with regards to dispersion indices, there is the role
of chance (P4), which is a confluence of the predictability of the political future and the
degree of control over historical development. Bashar with an index of .97 attributes a
very high role to chance.
Locating Bashar in Holsti’s six types of belief systems requires using the I1 and
P4a scores to determine what type of leader he is, making inferences about his general
disposition. Accordingly, because of his .24 and .22 instrumental scores, respectively, he
is placed in the A quadrant for FOLLOW/COOPERATE STRATEGIES, most closely
under the EED Bluff subtype, or Escalate, Escalate, De-Escalate. What this means is that
Bashar, when facing the ‘other,’ will often escalate, at which point the other will escalate.
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Bashar will respond to this escalation by de-escalating, meaning he will violate the norm
of reciprocation. Bashar, under quadrant A guidelines, will likely use methods of bluffing
within a general strategy of cooperation. Unfortunately, because the tactical intensity
index does not move too much towards cooperation, and in fact straddles the image
between cooperation and conflict, there is not a particularly high confidence level in the
assertion that Bashar will absolutely violate the norm of reciprocation, meaning there is
the possibility he will go with further escalation.
With Holsti there existed an assumption that the instrumental followed the
philosophical. However, Walker, Schafer and Young leave room for the two to differ. In
fact, Bashar differs in the ‘other’ code, or philosophical, placing him in Quadrant C under
subtype EDD Compel. This means that Bashar will expect escalation, followed by a deescalation. Reciprocation will commence with a counter de-escalation. Again, however,
tactic intensity is low and as a result does not yield a high confidence level for this
prediction as a deviation from the reciprocity norm.
The self and other add together to form “important features of the context for
decision to reach a definition of the ‘self-in-situation.’ This definition of the situation
reflects the choice and shift propensities attributed to Self and expected of Other….”256
Bashar may be classified under the A(Instrumental) with C(Philosophical) hybrid. He is
ambitious in that he will tend to test his limits, but will pull back when faced with the
possibility of too much escalation. Of others, Bashar believes that they will threaten, but
in the end, because of Bashar’s handling of the situation in a non-threatening way, a
climate of reciprocation will have been created that causes conflict to cease and harmony
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to increase.

Conclusion
Bashar’s self-confidence is not particularly high compared to other leaders. He
has little need for power and very little in-group bias. This could account for his desire to
challenge constraints. It could also account for his frequent desire to engage much of the
regional, and even international community. Further, his distrust of others is also low,
which is strange considering the relative secrecy of the country. It would seem
reasonable that a country with a high need for secrecy and repression would also be a
country with a leader who is distrustful. However, as has been made clear, the country
has had some limited opening up. That Bashar hasn’t opened up entirely is a testament to
his respect for the constraints around him.
Bashar’s middle of the road score on the belief that he can control events is
complimented by a high conceptual complexity and task-focus, traits normally associated
with intelligence, acceptance of other views, and a desire to get the job done. These are
also not typical traits of Middle Eastern Leaders, showing him as being very outside the
norm in this regard. He is high where they are low, and low where they are high. This
could mean any number of things, but more than likely points to a Catch-22: Bashar
desires change, but also desires fitting in.
Bashar’s scores on trait analysis place him similar in mindset to Hafiz Al-Assad,
but not to the extent that they are the same person. It is impossible to tell for certain
whether the two would make like decisions in all circumstances, as the dynamic nature of
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the domestic and foreign environment make this impossible. However, their similarity
means an in-depth case study of the father, complimented by a psychological profile of
the son, will make for an intriguing ability to forecast.
Using Operational Coding, we have created a number of very penetrating
statements regarding Bashar’s psyche. Bashar believes in a somewhat friendly universe,
is slightly cooperative in terms of his strategies for dealing with others, and is somewhat
optimistic about realizing his own goals. A few of these scores obviously compliment the
trait analysis. Others show his subconscious ability during speech, such as his belief that
utility in appeal and support statements is high, while others show his subconscious
ability during action, namely a high flexibility regarding cooperation and conflict.
Bashar’s psyche using this particular tool is important because it helps to
penetrate the way Bashar views himself vs. the way he views the ‘other.’ The other can
be described as an opponent or another country in the foreign arena, or even rivals in the
invisible layer in the domestic arena. Understanding Bashar’s view towards others has
helped us determine the range of latitude he will give himself in making action, and the
notion of reciprocity has helped further narrow down his decision-making ability in crisis
situations.
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Conclusion

Bashar is a complex figure, enigmatic and interesting, and with a mind that is not
particularly close to the traits of other Middle Eastern leaders. We have learned over the
course of this research that the status of Syria as a pariah to the world has as much to do
with an overall situation as it does with an ideological core. Syria’s president has no
particular overarching ideological fervor, except perhaps towards computers. This has
more to do with modernization, however, than a particular fondness for inanimate
objects.
In coming to understand Bashar, we have gone over the situation, the rivals, the
past, the society, the economy and a whole host of lesser variables. We also went over
his mind, taking as much as we could learn from a detailed quantitative methodological
analysis, putting Bashar’s psychology center-stage. The two can now be joined together
to make certain hypotheses regarding forecasting. For instance, we know that Bashar is
moving towards more economic development for Syria. We also know that he is not
necessarily untrusting. If this analysis had been around a few years ago, the constant
engagement of regional neighbors would seem perfectly understandable, even during the
isolating time of the Bush Administration.
The purpose of ‘bridging the gap’ in order to help policy makers, as described in
the introduction, means that this analysis is primarily for policy makers. Policy makers
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must use scholarly works not just to understand what is going on, since intelligence
agencies do a fine job of keeping policy makers up to date on current events. What is
needed is a different way of viewing the information, and different methodologies in
order to get at information not normally viewable.
What is implied here is that this is not necessarily a ‘new’ way of organizing data.
It is a conglomeration of another way of organizing data, using the best methodological
and analytical tools for this particular case. Many methodologies require some
component that is difficult to get, or take the analysis in a direction it doesn’t necessarily
need to go. In this case, the analysis pointed towards the leader, and as a result, a strong
component of this analysis remains the psychological analysis. Any psychological
profile however, would be unfinished without an expert in the field, usually an expert
who views the world using the more common structural methods. Leadership analysts
should either know the material themselves, or as a number of them have done in the
past, seek collaboration in order to pull the methods together.
Allison and Zelikow’s models were useful, but not wholly adequate in and of
themselves. They needed to be added to with a rich infusion of other methods like
history and psychological profiling, and augmented by a more in-depth discussion of
their methods, like Neustadt for Model III, or Weber for Model II. All three models
turned out to be useful, but they also turned out to lack the rich profile needed for a truly
in-depth review of decision making in Syria.
The original purpose of this paper was to help policy makers understand the mind
of the key decision-maker in Syria, and in understanding his world view and decisional
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outlooks, I believe this purpose has been accomplished. Using both structural and
psychological profiling methods has added the depth I believe the policy community
deserves. It is up to the policy makers and diplomats to study the information in order to
come up with prudent policy decisions. The psychological analysis showed that Bashar’s
actions may be predictable, but they are more useful in dealing with him on a one-to-one
basis.
In this scholar’s humble opinion, there are two key regrets of the analysis. The
first was not being able to utilize integrative complexity, a highly complex method of
scoring statements that would allow us to track Bashar’s own psychological change. The
second was an inability to truly understand the inner dynamics of Bashar’s group
processes. Even with years of studying Syria from inside the country, however, it is
unlikely that such a treasure trove of information would be revealed in such a poorly lit
country. This brings us to the final regret, namely that a more in-depth case study
analysis could not be performed. That will be the subject of a future project, using this
analysis as the primer.

The preceding analysis has added complexity to methodologies, each of which are
intended to simplify. However, the complexity is a good thing as long as both structural
and agency specific methodologies are treated in kind. The following is a (probably too
long) policy primer for what to expect from Syria, and how to deal with Bashar more
specifically.
Policy towards Syria during the Bush II administration was one of semi-isolation
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with some joint work on terrorism and securing the Iraqi border. Policy during the
Obama administration appears to be one of attempting to pull Syria away from Iran in an
attempt to isolate the latter. Throughout both administrations (more so during the
former), there has been a steady call for regime change.
Bashar Al-Assad will stay on as President for the foreseeable future. Free
elections, which Bashar talked about the possibility of, as well as a coup, are unlikely.
The former will not be allowed by those interested in keeping the status quo. A coup is
unlikely for much the same reason. Bashar’s personality suggests he will not make the
large waves needed to induce the old guard to provide for his ouster. Further, the power
and political moves he has made give him enough of a base in the important positions of
the country that he has at least enough of a consolidated base of support. Regime change
will likely be a long time coming, and any strategy of dealing with Syria that waits for
this outcome will collect dust.
Peace without the Golan Heights is possible, but unlikely. This precious Syrian
area was Hafiz’ need, but Bashar has only two reasons for wanting to get it back: his
father’s legacy, and a need to maintain his power. Given that Bashar’s need for power is
as small as it is, the capacity for Bashar to seek peace without this all important area will
depend upon two factors: whether or not enough carrots are provided to make it worth his
while, or enough sticks are presented that de-escalation becomes cooperation. As long as
Bashar has enough reasons to stay in power, i.e. the belief that he can move towards his
goals, then peace without the Golan Heights will be pushed farther down the line.
Peace with the Golan Heights is still more possible, but only slightly less unlikely
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given the current climate. This is due to a feeling of strength Syria can attain by Bashar’s
engagement of others. Bashar’s father waited years to recover the Golan Heights on
good terms, and it never came to fruition. Bashar’s current strategy of engaging close
U.S. allies in the region like Jordan, Turkey and Saudi Arabia means that the young
President is moving in a direction which puts more emphasis on allies and economic
normalization in the region, and less emphasis on ‘peace.’ However, look down the road
far enough and this may have the affect of placing more pressure to move in a
conciliatory direction on the region in general, including Israel specifically – if only
because an integrated network of countries may cause conflict to subside. Integration
occurs and makes bedfellows, some strange and others not so strange: Saudi Arabia and
Israel with a common ally in the United States, and a common foe in Iran. Turkey and
Israel, again with a common ally, but with the occasional spat have an interest in
normalization in the region, and also a common ally. Bashar’s choice to engage all
except Israel may cause an excess of normalization in the region, leading in one
direction. However, this is a systemic approach to the situation and unlikely to occur
simply because of ‘normalization.’ Likely, it will take a perfect storm of leaders with
enough political legitimacy, a willing public, pressure from outsiders, and perhaps a
major catalyst of some sort. Normalization may or may not be a concentrated strategy on
Bashar’s part, but it is certainly a consequence of a desire to move his own country out of
pariah status and into increasing economic development.
Countries dealing with Syria should only work towards greater integration of
economic development if they realize that Bashar’s ability to move in that direction is
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dependent upon a complex interplay of bargaining, Bashar’s own psychological faculties,
and the position that domestic Syria sits as a result of its recent history. Bashar needs to
maintain a certain legitimated position. This legitimacy is dependent upon the ability of
Bashar to be able to continue the same merchant-military complex and aggregation of
Ba’athist societal goals that was expected of him when he came into power. If other
country’s foreign policies are geared towards giving Bashar the needed power to pursue
his goals, we might very well see the reformer that so many hoped they would see almost
a decade ago.
When dealing with Bashar the man, and not Syria the country, one must keep the
operational coding and trait analysis above in mind in order to work around his
perspective. He is going to be very open to new possibilities, and his complexity will
ensure that he’ll see the both the upside and the downside to any proposal. He will likely
see both the cooperative and competitive methods of dealing with proposed policies, so it
will be very important for a policy maker to frame the problem around several solutions,
and let Bashar know that we have considered many angles, and why the one we want is
important. He prides himself on his ability to communicate with the world. As a result,
it is even more important than with more closed dictators to engage the man on a one-toone basis.
Bashar’s low belief in his own control goes hand in hand with his low self
confidence. However, he also likely knows his conceivable options very well. This will
require an experienced diplomat who has no qualms about speaking to a dictator as if he
were a close confidant. Bashar’s inability (or belief in his inability) to influence much
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won’t help the United States change things much at the tactical level, but will lay the base
work for the strategic changes down the road. If Bashar is given the right element of
carrots (or sticks) to show his constituency, his belief in the importance of modernization
may change from giving simple lip service to real proposals. He will always run up
against the old guard, but with enough gifts to bring back to them, he can cause change.
These gifts will likely have to be economic gifts in the mid-term, in order to get real
change later on issues more important to the US.
Bashar can switch quickly between possible outcomes like conflict and
cooperation, or words and deeds. He just needs the right impetus. He has the formal
power needed to make the changes, but the informal power is where he runs into his
biggest weakness. If Bashar can switch quickly, it means he likely is never locked into
one course of action. His mind can be swayed, and since there can be no peace without
Syria, a concentrated effort at winning over Bashar Al-Assad is too good a possibility to
pass up. Waiting for regime change may mean a corrupt and slow to change Yasser
Arafat, or a violent and difficult Saddam Hussein.
Bashar’s ability to focus on problems is high, his distrust of others is low, and his
bias towards his own group is also low, meaning he can be approached, reasoned with,
and will be a very determining partner. His biggest walls will be his high perception of
chance, low regard for his ability to change things, and his use of opposition and
resistance statements in the media and to the public. These weaknesses, and his
structural situation of holding less power than his father, do not allow us to call this the
perfect storm the world may be waiting for regarding change in the Middle East. Waiting
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for one, however, would be looking a gift horse in the mouth.
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